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I. INTRODUCTION  
In today’s dizzying world of change and evolution, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) is constantly looking for ways to improve itself.  From employing direct-energy 
weapons to the use of network-centric warfare, many revolutionary ideas within the DoD 
are changing the way we do business.  With think tanks such as the DoD Office of Force 
Transformation dedicated to creating ideas to sustain “American competitive advantage 
in warfare” (http://www.oft.osd.mil/), many such concepts can leave defense managers 
saying, “That’s a good idea, but how do we implement it?” 
One such idea has been the consolidation of maintenance facilities.  This is being 
supported by a shift in naval shipyard financial management from a business-like 
structure that employs working capital funding to one of fixed, directly mission-funded 
resources.  Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNSY) was the first to transform in this way 
in 1998.  As the second organization to undergo this transformation, Puget Sound Naval 
Shipyard (PSNS) has obtained lessons learned from PHNSY.  However, these lessons 
may not be enough to guide its managers through the transformation given each 
organization’s unique traits.   
Scholars of private sector organizations have been studying organizational and 
change theory for decades.  Today’s literature can provide guidelines for implementing 
lasting change.  Using the successes and failures of private firms and their documentation 
in today’s change management literature, this thesis aims to provide guidelines for 
implementing the change to mission-funded naval shipyards.   
 
A. OBJECTIVES 
The primary research goal of this thesis is to determine how naval shipyard 
management could better implement mission funding (MF) after having operated 
extensively under a Working Capital Fund (WCF) structure.  To help reach this objective, 
the following supporting research questions were explored: 
• What are the differences between WCF and MF?  What managerial implications 
do each hold for the shipyard manager? 
• What organizational theories can be applied to change at the naval shipyards? 
2 
 
• What are some basic principles of transformational change?  How can these 
principles be applied to the naval shipyards’ transformation? 
 
B. SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to: 
• Explain the principles of and differences between WCF and MF, including the 
associated management issues as they pertain to the naval shipyards.   
• Describe organizational and management principles that can be used to 
successfully transform the shipyard’s way of doing business.  
• Describe the rationale behind the change in the naval shipyard financial structure 
from WCF to MF and a case study in this change.   
• Suggest guidelines that the shipyard manager can use in the attempt to transform 
his or her organization. 
This research will not: 
• Examine the soundness of the decision to convert the shipyards from WCF to MF. 
• Explore in detail the managerial issues revolving around the merger of two 
organizations. 
• Propose specific metrics for the implementation of shipyard pilot programs. 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Current organizational theory and change management literature provided the 
backdrop to understand and analyze the shipyard transformation process.  Literature, 
specifically in the study of public sector change, was selected from academic journal 
bibliographies and from academic references in the NPS Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy Financial Management curriculum.  The assumption was that the 
lessons learned from the private sector could be applied to public sector change 
management, specifically the transformation of the naval shipyards. 
Navy financial systems were also reviewed in order to define financial and 
managerial boundaries for the shipyard manager.  The online Defense Working Capital 
Fund Handbook on the OSD Comptroller “iCenter” website, the Financial Management 
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in the Armed Forces (GB3510) Practical Financial Management Handbook, and personal 
interviews provided the materials for this research on the Navy financial systems.   
Field research at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard was conducted to gather the 
background information for the case study (see Chapter III).  Personal interviews, phone 
conversations, and e-mails with key change leaders within shipyard management were 
the primary data collection tools.  Additional data were gathered through personal 




Chapter II provides the overview of academic research on organizational and 
change management theory.  This research aims to provide shipyard managers with 
management guidelines that may be applied to their organizations.  Further, this 
background provides: a) an organizational framework and b) recurring principles of 
change management for use in the analysis of Chapter IV. 
Chapter III presents the details of the Navy’s transformational plans.  It explains 
the basic principles behind Navy maintenance and funding processes and examines the 
reasons, events, and trends leading to the shift in financial systems at the Puget Sound 
Naval Shipyard.  Finally, the case study explores the implementation of the Puget Sound 
pilot plan as it currently stands, examining the management issues that have surfaced. 
Chapter IV presents an analysis of the Puget Sound pilot plan based on the change 
management principles and organizational framework researched in Chapter II.  It 
examines how well PNSN management has implemented a change program and analyzes 
how close it has come to implementing the management principles for a successful 
financial management change program.  In doing so, it examines the applicability of 
change management principles to future naval shipyards undergoing the change to 
mission funding. 
Chapter V offers the findings of this research and answers to the research 
questions posed in Chapter I.  It also summarizes the lessons learned from Chapter IV.  In 
addition, it explains the limitations for this type of thesis research.  Finally, it presents 

















The naval shipyard, like any other major public organization, operates with a 
multitude of interconnecting processes and people.  From project planning and 
management to material ordering and work package production, right down to the rigging 
and welding of repair parts, the shipyard’s internal processes form an intertwined 
network of administrative, maintenance, repair, and modernization workflows.  With so 
many details involved in the interactions and processes within their organizations, 
shipyard managers face a potentially daunting task in conducting managerial analysis:  
How can a manager begin examining an organization as complex as a naval shipyard?  
This chapter explores a framework that will be used to analyze the case study 
presented in Chapter III.  It then examines principles of transformation that have led to 
successful organizational change in the private sector and apply those principles within 
the context of the organizational framework.  The aim is to provide private-sector 
principles for use by shipyard managers who are or will be changing the way they do 
business.  These principles, along with the organizational framework, will be used to 
conduct the analysis in Chapter IV.  Before delving into this foundational set of 
principles, however, the chapter will first explore the origins and general purpose of 
organizational theory. 
 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
For over sixty years, organizational theorists have studied, analyzed, and 
attempted to frame organizations to help managers understand the broad dynamics of 
their establishments (Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2003: p. 2).  In the early years of what has 
become an accepted scientific field, these theorists used static models to describe 
organizations.  The intent was to provide a sort of map for organizations to follow, 
despite the lack of any historical, sociological, or philosophical analysis of the 
organization itself (Albrecht, et. al, editors, “Administrative Behavior”, 2002).   
The shift away from this static theory began with the writings of Herbert Simon 
(1976) in the mid-1940s when he wrote that an organization is more than simply an 
organizational chart but a “complex pattern of communication and relationships in a 
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group of human beings” (p. xvii).  This systems approach to organizations (looking at the 
establishment as a complete system) proved to be well ahead of Simon’s time, for it was 
not until the 1990s that this method began to be widely used by corporate executives 
(Albrecht, et. al, eds., “Administrative Behavior”, 2002).  
Today, the systems approach to organizational models has evolved into analyzing 
organizations as open systems (Nadler and Tushman, 1988).  Using this approach, one 
can view the organization on the most basic level as a system that converts inputs to 
outputs.  The focus here lies in the conversion process itself, which takes environmental 
inputs such as resources and information, transforms those inputs, and produces 
organizational outputs in the form of goods or services.  Figure 1 illustrates this concept.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Basic Open-System Organizational Model.  [From: Thesis Author] 
 
A critical detail distinguishes this organizational theory from its predecessors:  an 
open system interacts with and is interdependent on its surroundings.  Thus, an external 
change affects the organization and an internal change affects the environment, shifting 
the equilibrium between the two.  This same interdependence also occurs within the 
organization as each interconnected sub-process affects the others.  In the end, successful 
management of these interdependencies, both external and internal, leads to the 
successful completion of the conversion process.   
Using an open system model to describe the naval shipyards requires that 
managers develop a holistic view of their organization.  It is believed that through this 
Interdependence
Interdependence
    Output 
Organization 
  Input 
 
      Conversion    
         Process Environment 
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theoretical lens, managers are able to identify internal organizational relationships and 
gain a clearer view of the business.  Most importantly, by reducing organizational 
complexities, the framework can serve as a managerial tool to help managers make more 
informed decisions about the change process.       
 
B. THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM’S FRAMEWORK  
The Organizational System’s Framework (OSF) (Roberts, 2003) is an open 
system model that provides both a broad view of an organization (both public and 
private) and an in-depth look at its components (see Figure 2).  With its six basic 
elements and an extensive consideration for the environmental context, it seeks to 
describe the often-shifting, dynamic equilibrium that the organization has with its 
surroundings.  
When its environment changes, a firm must adapt for it to reestablish equilibrium.  
Organizations adapt by what the OSF terms corrective interventions:  managers steer the 
business in a new direction or make modifications in its basic design.  In turn, as the 
establishment adapts, it has its own impact on the world around it.  This open system 
model, then, describes the “mutual adaptation” (Roberts, 2003) between the organization 
and its surroundings.  This mutual adaptation is a key concept in the model’s application 
to the naval shipyards.   
With this overview of the Organizational System’s Framework, the following 
section explores the main elements of the model.    
1. Definition of Terms 
The Organizational System’s Framework consists of three major categories:  
components external to the system, those found internal to it, and those that emerge from 
these first two categories.  External components involve the organization’s key success 
factors and its environment.  Internal components, on the other hand, contain the system’s 
direction and design factors.  Lastly, emergent components include the organization’s 
culture and its results.  This section defines each of these components and leads to a 




Figure 2.   Organizational System’s Framework.  [From: Roberts, 2004] 
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a. External Components 
Key Success Factors declare the actions required for the system to achieve 
its conversion process and thus provide the guidelines for organizational success.  
Managers take these factors into consideration when they are planning the direction of 
their organizations.  The Environment or Context contains what is commonly referred to 
as PESTs (GB 4014, 2003):  political, economic, social and/or technological trends that 
may impact the organization.  An analysis of the PESTs explores the environmental 
issues that affect the open system and serve as important inputs to the organization’s 
conversion processes.  Although external to the system, these elements present important 
issues for managers and stakeholders of an organization. 
b. System Direction 
System Direction plots the course for the organization.  Upper 
management makes major contributions to organizational results through this element.  
Through seven directional sub-elements, managers and stakeholders frame the issues at 
hand and take actions necessary to adapt the business to environmental changes.   
The first of these directional sub-elements, the system’s Mandate, 
describes the official statement that defines a public organization and sets forth its 
parameters of action.  For example, NASA’s mandate to land a man on the Moon in the 
1960’s and its more recent mandate to land a man on Mars declared one of the 
organization’s required outputs, providing one basic element of system direction.   
The system’s mandate is different from its Mission, which defines the 
organization’s reason for existing.  In the context of an open system, it describes the 
conversion process of the organization in terms of its inputs, conversion process, and 
outputs:  it defines what the business does, for whom, and how it will attempt to 
accomplish this.  The establishment’s mission is often manifested in an organizational 
mission statement, which can include a presentation of the organization’s major 
competencies and motivations. 
The OSF also distinguishes the organization’s vision from its mandate and 
mission.  Whereas both mission and mandate deal with what is or what must be done 
today, the OSF defines organizational Vision as what the business will be and what it will  
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look like in the future, if it is successful.  An organization’s vision is usually declared via 
a separate vision statement and should provide as vivid a description of the organization’s 
future state as possible.   
Throughout its lifetime, and through its critical interaction with its 
surroundings, an organization will face several major challenges or questions.  Without 
managerial corrective interventions, these key issues could put the business’s future in 
jeopardy.  The OSF defines such a critical concern as an organization’s Strategic Issue.  
Dealing with this issue, management develops a Strategy that describes how the 
organization will achieve its mission, mandate, and vision despite the strategic issue at 
hand.  These critical elements help mold the organization and aid in creating strategic 
direction for the entire system. 
In building its plans, management further defines system direction with 
organizational values and beliefs and by setting goals.  Through Values and Beliefs, 
managers describe the manner of behavior that the organization espouses – they are 
declared values and beliefs and may not describe the actual conduct of business within 
the organization.  (The business’s actual conduct is later described within the element of 
organizational culture.)  Finally, the OSF defines Goals as those actions that must be 
achieved by the organization to achieve success.   
 Using these seven elements of system direction, shipyard managers can 
better plan for the future success of their organizations.  Furthermore, these principles 
provide tools by which the business can adapt to its environmental changes.  Along with 
these seven direction-setting elements, the OSF contains additional levers for change, 
particularly in the system’s five major design factors. 
c. Design Factors 
The OSF Design Factors provide a description of how work within the 
organization is accomplished.  The OSF’s design factors include the organization’s 
People, describing their specific traits:  skills, abilities, and knowledge.  The OSF also 
characterizes people by their mindsets, motivations, and expectations.  These qualities 
serve to describe a particularly important design factor and illustrate a key 
interrelationship within the organization. 
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The OSF design factors also include a description of the basic Tasks or 
Jobs that the organization’s people perform.  Additionally, they look into the 
Technology, or the flow, of this work.  During an organizational change process, tasks 
and workflows become especially important for people as the very nature of their work is 
redefined. 
The system design factors also describe the organizational Structure:  the 
degree of centralization of command, the method of assigning responsibility, and the 
method of integrating structures.  Under this structure, the OSF also explores the 
Processes or Subsystems that operate within the organization:  the financial and human 
resource management structures, the communication and information processing systems, 
and the methods of acquisition and contracting.  These design features not only help to 
describe the organization’s internal structures and processes, but serve as further tools for 
implementing change.  While they define the organization at one point in time, they also 
offer the means to change the organization in the future.   
d. Emergent Components 
The organizational Culture describes the manifested attitudes and 
behavior of the people in the organization:  people may interact with one another and 
with stakeholders differently than what is espoused in the organization’s stated values 
and beliefs.  One may wonder why the system culture is not contained within the 
organization’s design factors.  The OSF contends that culture emerges from the 
organization’s upstream processes.  An organization’s culture thus cannot be designed; 
rather, it emerges from the system’s direction and design factors.   
As discussed earlier, an open system takes environmental inputs through a 
conversion process and produces outputs.  The OSF, however, takes this level of analysis 
further by distinguishing between organizational outputs and outcomes as two separate 
results of the conversion process.  Outputs describe the goods or services that the 
organizational processes produce.  Outcomes, on the other hand, represent the 
consequences of the goods or services for various stakeholders.  Both of these 
organizational results are defined and measured by performance indicators and metrics; 
however, the business outputs describe more tangible results than the consequential 
outcomes, although both hold equal importance in the analysis of the organization.  
12 
2. Additional Characteristics 
The OSF provides a great level of detail in describing the internal characteristics 
and processes of an organization.  This level of detail transcends other models used in 
organizational theory, particularly in its consideration of the organization’s culture, 
outputs, and outcomes as key aspects to an organization’s design.   
Managers and stakeholders measure organizational performance through feedback 
loops, as shown by the OSF in Figure 2, and adjust system direction accordingly, using 
corrective interventions to align the organization with a new direction.  This internal 
change process based on feedback involves interventions that can cause either total 
system change (transformational change) or changes that are meant to affect only certain 
parts of the system (incremental change).  Whether the interventions are intended to 
change the entire system or just certain elements, the OSF presumes these interventions 
have a ripple effect throughout the entire organization:  a change in one part of the 
organization, such as its financial management structure, can affect every element of the 
organization.  This concept, along with its applicability to the naval shipyards, is explored 
in greater detail in this chapter and in Chapter IV. 
3. Summary 
The Organizational System’s Framework provides an effective means for 
analyzing our naval shipyards as open systems.  Because the OSF provides both a broad 
view and a detailed analysis of either public or private organizations and seeks to 
describe the organization’s interdependence on the environment, it has been chosen to 
examine the current change process for Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.  Applications of its 
principles will be used in the analysis of Chapter IV.  With an understanding of the 
underlying concepts of the Organizational System’s Framework and its critical elements, 
the chapter will now review the basic principles change management theory.   
 
C. THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE 
Within the realm of organizational sciences, change management theory has been 
a relatively recent development.  In 1963, with the writing of A Behavioral Theory of the 
Firm, Richard M. Cyert and James G. March introduced the concept of organizational 
learning, which states that a business learns from its experiences and from the experience 
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of other businesses (Augier and March, 2002). Like Herbert Simon (1976), they argued 
against the contemporary theory of their time that viewed businesses as static and 
constant:  “If we take seriously the concept of a firm as something distinct from an 
individual entrepreneur, there is no consensus on a theory of a firm.” (Cyert and March, 
1963: p. 10)  This work introduced a new organizational science dealing with the 
management of change.   
The change literature has undergone its own transformation.  Before the mid-
1980s, change was viewed primarily as driven from the top of an organization.  The early 
literature recognized the theory of change management generally as a chief executive 
looking inward on the organization to envision and implement change (Forbes, Jr., 1973; 
OECD, 1980; Weiss, 1986).  This theory later shifted to a bottom-up approach, one that 
believed that an organization should look to its surroundings in an adaptive and inventive 
manner rather than waiting for upper level management to drive and implement change 
(Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector, 1990; Grove, 1996; Kotter, 1996; Thornhill et al., 2000; 
Jick and Peiperl, 2003).    
Change management has come to the forefront of managerial agendas around the 
world, as evidenced by its pervasiveness in today’s managerial literature.  Management 
texts, both in private and in public sector publications, teem with such catch phrases as 
“organizational transformation,” “reengineering,” and “continuous improvement.”  A 
search conducted on the Library of Congress Online Catalog (http://catalog.loc.gov/) for 
the keyword “organizational change” alone yielded over 10,000 entries (more than could 
be displayed) since 1990.   
With such vast literature available in any public library or online bookstore, the 
information on this topic can overwhelm the operational manager.  Within the context of 
our systems model, however, the management of change simply seeks to describe and 
analyze one thing:  the adaptation of an open-system model to changes in its 
surroundings.  Change management becomes necessary when a change in the 
environment stresses the organization’s shifting equilibrium.  Thus, with an 
understanding of the basic principles of open-system models and a background in change 
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management theory, we can narrow our scope of the available literature.  At the same 
time, we can analyze the dynamics of an organization like the naval shipyard as it adapts 
to its environmental change. 
 
D. GUIDANCE FOR MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 
Much of today’s change management literature examines the successes and 
mistakes of private firms that have undergone transformational change (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1989; Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector, 1990; Kotter, 1996; Schaffer and Thomson, 
1998; Strebel, 1998; Jick, 2003; Amis, Slack, and Hinings, 2004).  Although such texts 
present guiding principles for organizations in the private industry, many of these 
concepts can be soundly applied to today’s naval shipyards.  These works in no way 
provide a single checklist or framework for the shipyards to follow.  However, selecting 
recurring and frequently suggested concepts from these academic sources provides a 
basis for analysis in Chapter IV.  These concepts will offer methods for managers who 
are attempting to navigate through the naval shipyard’s shift in financial management 
processes. 
Among the change management literature reviewed for this research, six recurring 
factors for successfully implementing a transformational program emerge: (a) creating a 
clear vision; (b) obtaining the critical mass in a change leadership coalition; (c) 
communicating on multiple levels; (d) addressing change inertia; (e) creating a learning 
organization through short-term results, and; (f) rewarding change (Nadler and Tushman, 
1989; Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector, 1990; Beckhard, 1992; Kotter, 1996; Schaffer and 
Thomson, 1998; Strebel, 1998; Thornhill et al., 2000; Albrecht, et. al, editors, 
“Implementing an Effective Change Program”, 2002; Heller, 2002; Jick, 2003; Amis, 
Slack, and Hinings, 2004).  These six principles provide the framework for analyzing the 
Navy shipyards’ shift to a mission funding structure.   
1. Formulating a Clear System Vision Statement 
With their organization experiencing pressure for change, managers and 
employees alike face a number of questions:  What should we do?  Should we change?  
How and in what manner should we change?  How will these changes affect the 
organization?  Managing change requires creating a vision for change and a set of  
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matching strategy and goals that can answer such questions (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; 
Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector, 1990; Kotter, 1996; Collins and Porras, 1998; Thornhill et 
al., 2000; Jick, 2003).   
The importance of a vision surfaces in Kotter’s (1996) 15-year study of private 
sector organizations.  He finds that many unsuccessful transformations attempt to provide 
direction through complicated plans and programs that not only fail to explain 
management’s vision but actually blur it (p. 8).  He asserts that vision statements of 
effective change programs have four focusing traits:  (a) They eliminate many or all 
possible misinterpretations of the vision; (b) they single out areas requiring change; (c) 
they set clear targets, and; (d) they are reasonably concise (p. 78).  He adds that effective 
vision statements use metaphors and analogies and are simple with no “technobabble” (p. 
90).  Such characteristics, Kotter asserts, help create a clear picture of what the 
organization aims to be after the change process. 
Collins and Porras (1998) agree that a vision must be graphic, adding that vision 
statements must contain both passion and conviction and should translate words into such 
images that will linger in the minds of the organization’s people (pp. 42-44).  They 
emphasize this required vividness using the vision of Henry Ford: 
I will build a motor car for the great multitude….[sic]It will be so low in 
price that no man making a good salary will be unable to own one and 
enjoy with his family the blessing of hours of pleasure in God’s great open 
spaces….[sic]When I’m through everybody will be able to afford one, and 
everyone will have one.  The horse will have disappeared from our 
highways, the automobile will be taken for granted…[and we will] give a 
large number of men employment at good wages (As cited in Collins and 
Porras, p. 42). 
 
Henry Ford’s vision meets all of the criteria:  it illustrates what the organization is 
trying to do, communicates the reasons for the change, and helps to shift people’s 
mindsets from wondering how the change will affect them to wondering how they can 
contribute to the change.  An effective vision statement thus can serve to unite people 
under the tenets of change.  Moreover, such a vision statement provides the critical 
overarching principle for incremental, results-oriented efforts (a point discussed later in 
this chapter).   
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2. Obtaining Change Leadership Critical Mass 
A crucial driving force for formulating and communicating the organizational 
vision lies in the creation of a strong leadership coalition, led by a strong leader (Nadler 
and Tushman, 1989; Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector, 1990; Kotter, 1996; Albrecht, et. al, 
eds., “Implementing”, 2002; Jick, 2003).  Such a leader must keep all actions aligned 
with the organizational vision.  Nadler and Tushman (1989) explain that such a leader 
“serves as a focal point for the change, whose presence has some special ‘feel’ or 
‘magic’” (p. 200).  A strong, motivational leader provides the driving energy for change. 
Powerful leaders alone cannot sustain organizational change on their own.  Kotter 
(1996) explains that while executives take the lead in the transformational effort, they 
should leave most of the lower level managerial and leadership specifics to subordinates 
(p. 140).  A single change leader, then, cannot do it alone, no matter how inspirational 
and energetic:  he or she will need key stakeholder representatives, or a leadership core, 
to help drive change.  Jick (2003) explains that doing so not only promotes buy-in from 
the organization through collaboration in the planning process but also takes advantage of 
the different skills and strengths that stakeholders have to offer (p. 180).  Kotter (1996) 
agrees, further explaining the makeup of this leadership core:   
This group rarely includes all of the most senior people because some of 
them just won’t buy in, at least at first.  But in the most successful cases, 
the coalition is always powerful – in terms of formal titles, information 
and expertise, reputations and relationships, and the capacity for 
leadership (p. 6).   
 
Forming a core group of stakeholder representatives would thus increase the 
strength of leadership in the change process.  Without this critical mass, a leader’s change 
vision may not suffice against the organization’s tendency toward the old way of doing 
things.   
3. Communicating on Multiple Levels  
Even with a graphic vision of the future and a strong leadership core, 
communication can become the deciding factor between the life and death of a change 
program.  Successful change managers use effective communication as leverage against  
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inertia.  Effective communication builds urgency and supports the organizational vision, 
as discussed above.  But how can managers effectively communicate during a chaotic 
change process?   
Much of today’s management literature promotes open communications to create 
a sense of trust during the change process (Beckhard, 1992; Thornhill et al., 2000; 
Albrecht, et. al, eds., “Implementing”, 2002; Jick, 2003).  Being transparent and willing 
to listen to employees and involve them in the short-term successes (and failures) of the 
change tends to build trust and acceptance.  Kotter (1996) agrees with this openness, 
adding that actions speak louder than words:  “Nothing undermines the communication of 
a change vision more than behavior on the part of key players that seems inconsistent 
with the vision” (p. 97).  Employee involvement and buy-in is the ultimate aim of such 
communications, which could serve to overcome organizational inertia and give people a 
stake in the change process. 
Kotter also suggests methods of communicating the vision as a tool to involve and 
excite the organization’s people.  He explains that firms have failed in their 
communications by not communicating the vision on a day-to-day basis.  By using as 
many available channels of communication as possible, such as routine discussions, 
routine performance reviews, meetings, and memos, managers can repeat the message of 
change continually to ensure it reaches across the entire organization (p. 93).  When this 
is done, Kotter explains, the change message has a better chance of being remembered, 
both intellectually and emotionally.  Such communication can convey a permanence of 
the change program as well, helping to reduce inertia. 
4. Addressing Change Inertia 
Having strong change drivers that communicate a clear vision on a daily basis, 
however, will not guarantee that an organization’s people will buy into and collaborate in 
a change program.  Managers must obtain this acceptance and support from both 
employees and managers before implementing any change program (Kotter 1996; 
Thornhill et al., 2000; Heller, 2002; Jick, 2003).  Without this critical buy-in, change 
momentum can quickly dissipate.     
Although multiple reasons exist for this resistance people often view change 
movements simply as threats.  Paul Strebel expounds further on this point in his 1998 
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Harvard Business Review article “Why Do Employees Resist Change?”  He suggests that 
the basis of this phenomenon lies in the formal, psychological, and social contracts that 
employees create with their organization.  Three are particularly important:  the 
established task and performance requirements; the unwritten mutual agreements; and the 
actual (versus espoused) beliefs and values (p. 141-145).  When change comes along, 
these three contracts between employees (including middle managers) and the 
organization become threatened if they are not supported or renewed.   
Central to employee and managerial inertia or resistance is the concept of control 
(Strebel, 1998; Thornhill et al., 2000; Heller, 2002).  Managers and employees alike 
eventually become accustomed to certain standard operating procedures that establish a 
comfort zone in their work.  This comfort zone is disrupted when change occurs and must 
be reestablished to give people a sense of control.   
Heller (2002) explains further, stating that people, specifically managers, “prefer 
order and discipline to flux, and therefore seek to establish systems that provide 
predictability and control” (p. 277).  This disparity, he continues, creates a continual 
tension between an organization and its chaotic, changing environment.  Although senior 
DoD management has recently taken steps in overcoming this tension by championing 
change initiatives, employees cannot simply be directed to change.  Transformational 
change interrupts their organizational norms, breaches their comfort zones, and threatens 
their job control.   
Keeping in mind the nature of and reasons for change inertia, managers can 
understand that this opposition occurs throughout the change process.  Some scholars 
argue, however, that it should be planned for early on.  Jick, in his article “Implementing 
Change” (Jick and Peiperl, 2003), suggests that managers analyze their organization 
before even beginning a change process, systematically assessing the forces for and 
against change (p. 178).  In so doing, managers fulfill Sun Tzu’s edict, Know your 
enemy; know yourself:  they gain an understanding of the support they have for their 
transformational plans and the natural resistance they will be facing.  This does not, 
however, imply that the inertia should be looked upon as an enemy; rather, it is a natural 
equilibrium that every organization establishes with its people. 
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Kotter (1996) agrees with the advice to make a cautious and well-informed effort.  
He describes an organization’s change inertia as complacency and discusses the concept 
of change process urgency (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Kotter, 1996; Jick, 2003):  
By far the biggest mistake people make when trying to change 
organizations is to plunge ahead without establishing a high enough sense 
of urgency in fellow managers and employees.  This error is fatal because 
transformations always fail to achieve their objectives when complacency 
levels are high (p. 4).   
Instilling a sense of change urgency, he explains, aims at making the urgent need 
for change known throughout the organization.  Nadler and Tushman (1989) further 
expound that such urgency only comes about when people realize that they will be facing 
actual pain (p. 199):  pain that risks the well being of the establishment.   
This sense of urgency, however, should be used carefully.  It should not be 
confused with rushing an organization’s change efforts.  An incremental, results-based 
pace for change (discussed in the next section) aims at helping the transformation 
proceed in a controlled manner.  A sense of urgency, on the other hand, seeks to instill 
buy-in and support.  Further, as Jick (2003) explains, building this sense of urgency 
should not appear as if management is crying wolf (p. 179). This could then raise 
cynicism within the firm and risk the entrenchment of resistance to the change 
movement.  
The sense of urgency should also consider the long-term presence of change 
inertia.  As Kotter (1996) suggests, several transformational efforts have failed because 
management declared victory too soon in the process (p. 12).  Kotter explains that these 
firms did not understand that, once a transformation begins, inertia never really goes 
away; rather, the former equilibrium waits for any opportunity to correct itself.  Managers 
must thus recognize the resilience of change inertia and realize that fighting it is a long-
term battle.  Furthermore, this shows that organizational transformation requires the long-
term presence of change leadership.  
Change managers, therefore, must not only attend to the equilibrium between the 
organization and its environment, but the equilibrium between the organization and its 
people.  With this consideration for employees, managers attempt to align people with the 
organization and the environment.  This concept is illustrated in Figure 3.   
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Figure 3.   Equilibrium Concerns For Change Managers [From: Thesis Author] 
 
5. Creating a Learning Organization through Short-Term Results 
Several examples in today’s change management literature direct managers to 
seek organizational change and improvement based on incremental results (Nadler and 
Tushman, 1989; Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector, 1990; Beckhard, 1992; Kotter, 1996; 
Schaffer and Thomson, 1998; Thornhill et al., 2000; Albrecht, et. al, eds., 
“Implementing”, 2002; Amis, Slack, and Hinings, 2004).  This reveals a movement away 
from what Schaffer and Thomson (1998) call “activity centered programs” (p. 191) and 
what Kellaway (2002) terms “management fads” (p. 175).  Such programs aim to 
produce organizational transformation through a fundamental change in managerial 
philosophy and/or in organizational culture.  An example of these activity-based 
programs, Total Quality Management (TQM), became fervently followed throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s by both public and private institutions. These programs have been 
gradually abandoned as organizations increasingly discovered that they produced more 
bureaucracy and employee complaints than tangible improvement (Kellaway, 2002:  p. 
175).   
Improvements centered on short-term results, on the other hand, drive toward the 
heart of the change process:  the system’s outputs and outcomes.  As described by the 
basic open-system organizational model, the conversion of inputs to outputs provides the 
basis for the firm’s existence, thus placing a fundamental importance on organizational 
results.  By focusing on outputs and outcomes rather than on activities during a 








the change process itself.  Such feedback can serve several purposes.  Schaffer and 
Thomson (1998) explain that by seeking short-term results, managers can quickly and 
accurately assess the impact of their actions, eliminate activities that do not contribute to 
the change process, and create a learning process that builds on each incremental success 
(pp. 201-205).  This continuous feedback process thus affords a learning organization the 
flexibility needed to adapt throughout its transformation efforts.   
Kotter (1996) adds a human resource approach to this rationale, reasoning that 
such incremental results provide employees with opportunities to briefly celebrate during 
the difficult change process, help the change program win essential support from 
additional employees and managers, and show employees the benefits of their sacrifices 
(pp. 122-124).  Amis, Slack, and Hinings, in their article “The Pace, Sequence, and 
Linearity of Radical Change” (2004), agree: 
The organizations that we studied that completed programs of radical 
organizational change were characterized by initial bursts of change 
activity followed by relatively sedate progress toward the desired 
endpoint.  This process allowed opportunities for trust to be established 
and productive working relationships to be developed (p. 35). 
Success in a change program, then, relies on quick and decisive initial actions that 
create a sense of urgency.  Using the immediate feedback of incremental success and 
managing for results, management can establish a sufficient pace for change that not only 
keeps employees aligned with the change vision but re-establishes employee 
relationships.   
Schaffer and Thomson (1998) suggest another specific benefit of results-driven 
programs:  they prioritize improvements (p. 204).  Faced with a large set of possible 
changes, management must keep in mind which improvements should come first.  Amis, 
Slack, and Hinings (2004) broaden the analysis of this argument:  
What is important is the sequence in which organization elements are 
altered.  Our research clearly shows the importance of changing high-
impact decision-making elements early in a transition process.  Thus, even 
though change may progress at a slower pace after the initial generation of 
momentum, the early alteration to high-impact elements sends a clear 
message that the changes being implemented will be substantive and 
enduring (p. 35). 
22 
 
Short-term results thus help to provide the speed, prioritization, and 
communication of change.  In so doing, results-driven programs provide a structure and a 
plan for implementing transformational change.   
Managing for results, however, does not come without its downfalls.  Jick and 
Peiperl (2003) warn that making decisions based on numerical goals and results can 
cause employees to ignore quality, leading to transformational disaster (p. 164).  Collins 
and Porras (1998) agree, stating:  “When people in great organizations talk about their 
achievements, they say very little about earnings per share” (p. 34).  Thus, although 
incremental results provide the feedback and flexibility necessary to create adaptive 
plans, shipyard managers must remember the higher-level goal and the reasons for 
change.  This reasoning suggests the importance of a clear system direction and an 
appropriate communication structure, as discussed above. 
6. Rewarding Change Behavior 
When all is said and done, when managers have created a clear and 
communicable vision, obtained a leadership coalition, communicated the system 
direction throughout the organization, made considerations for change inertia, and 
produced an incremental results-oriented plan, all efforts will have been wasted if these 
managers do not consider the long-term implications of change on an establishment’s 
culture (Nadler and Tushman, 1989; Beer, Eisenstat, and Spector, 1990; Kotter, 1996; 
Heller, 2002; Albrecht, et. al, eds., “Implementing”, 2002;  Jick, 2003).  As explained by 
the OSF, although management cannot create it, organizational culture can be affected by 
the organization’s direction and design factors.  Keeping this in mind, each of the above 
sources emphasizes the importance of culture as the foundation for the future of a given 
transformation.   
Kotter (1996) provides an observation that explains why cultural change should 
emerge only in the latter part of a change process:  previous efforts to root change into  
culture have failed because they first of all attempted to change culture and secondly 
attempted to do so at the outset of a transformational program (p. 155).  He explains 
further:  
Culture is not something that you manipulate easily.  Attempts to grab it 
and twist it into a new shape never work because you can’t grab it.  
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Culture changes only after you have successfully altered people’s actions, 
after the new behavior produces some group benefit for a period of time, 
and after people see the connection between the new actions and the 
performance improvement (p. 156). 
 
Here Kotter reinforces the OSF’s notion that culture cannot be designed and that 
it emerges from and can only be affected by upstream changes.  Further, Kotter ties 
together the importance of short-term results, communicating a clear vision, and 
overcoming change inertia as steps toward altering cultural norms.  Culture most 
certainly should be considered early on through the analysis of change inertia.  However, 
institutionalizing change through the business’s culture should not be the end-all focus; 
instead, it should emerge from the change process.   
To institutionalize change, managers can employ several different methods.  Jick 
(2003) suggests that in order to instill change in organizational culture, management must 
meet three tenets:  (a) prove managerial commitment to change; (b) reward appropriate 
change activities, and; (c) draw the desired behavior into everyday life for employees    
(p. 183).  He then offers that rather than looking at institutionalizing change, managers 
should look to institutionalizing the journey (p. 183), thus making the change processes 
themselves a part of an evolving and on-going process.   
Albrecht, et. al (eds., “Implementing”, 2002) place emphasis on the learning 
aspect of an organization.  They recommend that management:  (a) integrate the learning 
process into training programs; (b) make efforts to prevent learning from becoming a 
chore; (c) monitor progress and take any corrective action quickly, and; (d) be open to 
employees about failure (p. 505).  Each of these steps further suggests the importance of 
managing the future of a change program by permeating cultural norms.  The change 
process itself, then, must be managed just as any other project or program.  
7. Summary 
Table 1 summarizes the six recurring success factors found in the research of 
change management literature.  While these six common guidelines do not provide an 
exhaustive checklist for successfully implementing the mission-funded Navy shipyard, 
they do, however, give these managers a structured methodology for beginning the 
change process.  These principles aim at giving shipyard managers a better understanding  
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of the long and difficult task that they now face, or will face in the coming years.  
Applications of these principles to shipyard managers and their organizations will be 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
Create a Clear 
Vision Statement 
Strive for a single interpretation of a concise, simple, yet graphic 
vision statement, specifying areas for change and communicating 
reasons for change. 
Amass a 
Leadership Core 
Even the most inspirational and energetic leaders need a leadership 




Actions visibly communicate management position on change; take 
every opportunity to communicate the change on a daily basis. 
Address Change 
Inertia 
Understand change inertia: employees have implicit contracts tying 
them to norms and comfort zones.  Instill a sense of urgency and 




Control the pace of change, create flexibility and learning, win 
employee support, and prioritize change through the immediate 
feedback of short-term results. 
Reward 
Change Behavior  
Cultural change can only emerge from a change process. Reward 
appropriate change activities and institutionalize the process of 
change in order to affect the organization’s culture. 
Table 1. Summary of Six Recurring Change Management Principles. 
 
 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The open system model of organizational theory, specifically the Organizational 
System’s Framework, provides a method for analyzing the complex shipyard 
organization.  By examining the interrelationships between important elements of the 
OSF, we can better frame the chaotic process of change as the shipyards undergo the shift 
in financial management structure and also gain a better understanding of the ripple 
effects of this corrective intervention.  This analysis is conducted in Chapter IV.  We can 
then attempt to apply the six recurring factors for transformational success in the private 
sector to the shipyards.  With the ultimate aim of providing improvements for 
implementing the mission-funded naval shipyard, the following chapter presents the case 
study for analysis:  the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.  
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III. CASE STUDY 
This chapter presents a case study in change management at a naval shipyard that 
resulted from a corrective intervention in its financial management structure.  The case 
will be analyzed in Chapter IV, applying the principles outlined in Chapter II.  As the 
most recent example of shipyard transformation under the Navy’s changing environment, 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard will be the focal point of discussion; it presents a unique 
and current look at the implementation of the mission-funded naval shipyard. 
The chapter first explains the different ways the Navy conducts maintenance on 
its ships and submarines and the basic principles of how it funds that maintenance.  It 
then traces the environmental trends that triggered the most recent change in the Navy’s 
maintenance philosophy and describes the changes that took place.  Finally, it presents 
the shipyard’s current challenges in implementing a dramatic transformation program and 
employee reactions to the change. 
 
A. NAVY MAINTENANCE AND FUNDING PROCESSES 
The Navy performs maintenance on its vessels on three basic levels:  
organizational, intermediate, and depot level.  Organizational level maintenance, as its 
name implies, can be performed by a ship’s own personnel, whether at sea or in port.  
Examples of such maintenance are periodic preventative maintenance such as the 
cleaning of filters or inspection of equipment.  Beyond the level of maintenance that 
ship’s personnel can support is intermediate level (I-level) maintenance, typically 
performed by a shore facility such as an Intermediate Maintenance Facility (IMF) or a 
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA).  I-level maintenance normally 
involves relatively quick turnaround times of less than one month.  Depot level (D-level) 
maintenance, on the other hand, normally takes several months, requiring capabilities or 
facilities beyond organizational and I-level maintenance.  It is typically performed by 
naval and private shipyards and can involve installing approved alterations and 
modifications “which update and improve the ship’s military and technical capabilities” 
(OPNAV Instruction 4700.7K, Maintenance Policy for U.S. Navy Ships, 2003).   
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A simplifying analogy that helps describe these processes is that of maintenance 
on a car.  Organizational maintenance, as related to your motor vehicle, would involve 
checking and adjusting the tire pressure or the oil level in the engine, something most 
people do by themselves.  I-level maintenance would involve adjustments normally 
performed by a mechanic at a garage, such as tire rotation and brake replacement.  D-
level maintenance, then, would be like replacing an entire engine, taking significantly 
more time and labor at the garage.  This range of maintenance actions illustrates the 
Navy’s three levels of ship and submarine maintenance.  As discussed later in this 
chapter, the unique nature of these three functional levels presents one of the catalysts for 
change at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. 
To finance these maintenance activities, the Navy uses three funding methods:  
the Navy Working Capital Fund (WCF), mission funding (MF), and reimbursable 
funding.  A WCF activity receives no appropriation of funds each year; rather, the 
customer reimburses all of its costs.  It uses a revolving fund of working capital and 
replenishes that fund by billing its customers for the full cost of work performed.  This 
funding methodology results in business-like practices and formal buyer-seller 
relationships.  While the activity is run much like a business by tracking costs and 
allocating overhead across jobs, there is, however, no profit incentive.  Furthermore, 
because the level of activity depends on the number of customer orders, there is an 
incentive to attract additional work to lower the per-unit allocation of overhead.  The 
bottom line objective, however, is to break even.     
A mission-funded activity, on the other hand, receives an annual appropriation 
from Congress that limits the scope of work by fixing the amount of funds and the time 
period during which they can be used.  Strict statutory sanctions prohibit violating those 
terms.  The work done by the activity is at the discretion of the activity head, so long as it 
conforms to the defined purpose of the appropriation.  This funding method thus does not 
involve a buyer-seller relationship.  Compared to the WCF, it is less business-like and 
more government-like:  it creates a benefactor-beneficiary relationship.  Given a fixed 
amount of money, a mission-funded activity’s incentives are to improve efficiency and to 
effectively prioritize work to maximize the value of the funds. 
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Finally, under reimbursable funding, a customer (the Fleet, as an example) 
reimburses a provider (such as a shipyard) for services or goods that it provides.  This is 
the means through which the WCF activity receives its funding:  all revenue for the WCF 
activity comes by way of reimbursable orders (sometimes simply referred to as 
reimbursables).  The Fleet pays for repairs and maintenance with funds that are allocated 
for such reimbursable transactions.  Under the WCF, the work is priced so that all costs 
are recovered:  direct, indirect, and overhead.  On the other hand, when a MF activity 
performs maintenance for the Fleet, the Fleet presumably receives less of an allocation of 
funds since the shipyard receives its own appropriated budget.  Those funds that would 
have been provided to the Fleet to pay for maintenance under the WCF structure are 
instead given to the shipyard.  The shipyard thus performs the maintenance on behalf of 
the Fleet.   
If it has sufficient capacity, however, the MF shipyard may also accept 
reimbursable work from other customers, although it cannot accept reimbursable funds 
from its primary customer.  Congress, through its limiting appropriations, has established 
an upper limit on the scope of such operations.  For example, a Pacific Fleet shipyard that 
is mission-funded to perform maintenance on Pacific Fleet ships is limited in the volume 
of work for those ships by the amount of funds in the appropriation, but it could accept 
work from the Atlantic Fleet on a reimbursable basis.  When this happens, since the MF 
shipyard’s overhead is already paid for through the congressional appropriation, the 
shipyard may only be reimbursed for the direct and indirect costs (but not overhead) 
associated with each individual customer order.   
Given this baseline examination of Navy maintenance and funding processes, the 
chapter will now trace the environmental trends that led to the fundamental change in 
financial management at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. 
 
B. THE MISSION-FUNDED PUGET SOUND NAVAL SHIPYARD 
In order to describe the change in financial management at Puget Sound Naval 
Shipyard in a logical manner, this section will first present a historical view of the 
environmental trends and mandates that resulted in change at PSNS.  It will then describe 
the two design factor changes that the shipyard has been mandated to implement:  
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structural change and financial management change.  Due to the effect of structural 
changes on management’s change implementation program, this design factor change 
will be discussed along with the financial management shift to mission funding. 
1. Environmental Trends and Mandates 
A series of political, economic, social, and technological trends brought about the 
drastic change in Puget Sound Naval Shipyard’s financial structure.  Some of these trends 
aimed at increased budgetary efficiency; others sought improved operational 
effectiveness.  Although these two concepts are paradoxical, they would soon merge with 
the naval shipyards at their intersection. 
a. Efficiency and Effectiveness  
On June 30, 1990, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued the 
memorandum “Strengthening Depot Maintenance Activities” requiring increased savings 
and efficiencies in defense D-level maintenance (Bachmann, 1995).  In line with federal 
financial reform legislation such as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Acts of 1985 and 1987 
and the 1990 Chief Financial Officer’s Act, this directive also established the Defense 
Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC) to develop strategies for cost reductions.  Five 
months later, Defense Management Report Decision (DMRD) 908 directed across-the-
board cuts in defense spending and established a target of $3.9 billion in savings by 
Fiscal Year 1995 (U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1992).  Shortly afterward, in 
December of 1991, the DDMC developed a Corporate Business Plan for Fiscal Years 
1991-1995 that described actions for achieving this target, including depot consolidation 
and closures aimed at reducing costs through economies of scale (Ibid). 
Defense depot maintenance thus became a target for obtaining financial 
efficiencies.  Transformation and shifting away from an old equilibrium was the key, and 
both the Deputy Secretary’s memorandum and DMRD 908 served as part of the financial 
catalyst for the consolidation of the naval shipyards.  Budgetary efficiency, however, 
would not become the only reason for maintenance consolidations. 
The end of the Cold War era resulted in another environmental catalyst for 
shipyard transformation.  The 1989 collapse of Communism in Eastern and Central 
Europe and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to a shift in U.S. defense focus from a 
single known adversary to a theatre of multiple, regional threats.  This change in the 
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world environment resulted in the 1993 DoD Bottom-Up Review, which consisted of a 
steering group chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and consisting 
of representatives from OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services (Bachmann, 1995).  This 
review analyzed the post-Cold War defense environment.  The panel recommended 
maintaining a defense force structure with the ability to respond to two near-simultaneous 
Major Regional Conflicts (Ibid).  Such a scenario, then, would require a ready and 
flexible maintenance capability to support mission effectiveness.   
b. The CNO Mandate 
With growing emphasis on financial efficiency and the redefinition of 
mission effectiveness, the Chief of Naval Operations introduced the Regional 
Maintenance Plan (RMP) in March of 1994.  This CNO mandate for the naval shipyards, 
implemented as the Regional Maintenance Program, aimed at streamlining the Navy’s 
maintenance processes through the consolidation of facilities into Regional Maintenance 
Centers (RMCs).  The goals of this plan were to (a) reduce excess infrastructure, (b) 
improve maintenance processes, (c) combine supply and maintenance functions, and (d) 
create compatible information technology systems across all three levels of maintenance 
(GAO/NSIAD-98-4, 1997).  The RMP sought to meet these goals through three phases:   
Phase 1 – Minimize redundancy across I-level maintenance and create 
Regional Repair Centers  
Phase 2 – Integrate all I- and D-level activities, creating Regional 
Maintenance Centers to service major regions of the United States 
Phase 3 – Create a single maintenance process to conduct all Fleet 
maintenance (Ibid) 
 
In August of 1995, the Pearl Harbor Shore Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity (SIMA) and the Submarine Base Pearl Harbor Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity consolidated under the RMP’s Phase 1 (Nazario, 1995).  The resultant activity, 
the Pearl Harbor Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility (NAVIMFAC or IMF), 
became the first command to consolidate ship and submarine I-level maintenance 
facilities, hiring close to 600 personnel who were separating from PHNSY (Consolidation 
Manager A Interview, 2004).  As Phase 1 continued with I-level consolidations in 
Bangor, Washington, the Navy made preparations for the next phase of the RMP.  To  
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show that a single maintenance activity could successfully support the full spectrum of 
work between I- and D-level maintenance in a region, the Navy began the Pearl Harbor 
Naval Shipyard pilot program.   
c. The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard Pilot Program 
On 30 April 1998, PHNSY consolidated with NAVIMFAC, Pearl Harbor, 
standing up the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility 
(PHNSY&IMF) in a two-year pilot program.  The pilot’s Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) established Commander, Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT) as PHNSY&IMF’s 
major claimant (GAO/NSIAD-99-199, 1999), making the Fleet the shipyard’s primary 
customer and source of funds.  The CONOPS retained Commander, Naval Sea Systems 
Command (COMNAVSEA) as the operating agent and technical authority (Ibid), 
preserving NAVSEA responsibility and management over the shipyard’s operations.  
This CONOPS structure, coupled by the subsequent change in financial management 
(discussed below), would give the Fleet greater control over shipyard operations.   
Prior to the consolidation, the Navy recognized that differing 
organizational and funding structures between the PHNSY (under the WCF) and the IMF 
(mission-funded) would hinder the combined activity’s ability to share resources and 
workloads.  Further, to create a single maintenance process under the RMP, it would need 
to create a single IT system for all three levels of maintenance.  It thus decided upon a 
single financial structure and opted to use MF over WCF.  The Navy argued that MF 
would better facilitate reaching the goals of the pilot by allowing for better workforce 
flexibility and infrastructure streamlining (Ibid).  Because the mission-funded workforce 
would be budgeted for at the beginning of a fiscal year (rather than labor charges being 
adjusted with each incremental job under WCF), the Navy would gain the ability to 
assign work to emergent needs.  This control, along with centrally funding all facilities, 
would then allow for better resource sharing, thus streamlining infrastructure.  
Additionally, the change to MF would presumably instill a higher level of financial 
discipline through a fiscally restrained budget.     
The proposed change in financial management under the Pearl Harbor 
pilot sparked a sharp and ongoing debate among and within Congress, OSD, and the 
Navy over which system was more appropriate for the consolidated activity (Ibid; GAO-
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01-19, 2001; Senate Armed Services Committee Report, 2003; Navy Report on Study of 
Lessons Learned, 2003; Harrell Phone Conversation, 2004).  Proponents of the MF 
structure saw the benefits to mission effectiveness arising from the centralized funding 
structure and praised working under constrained resources as fiscally efficient.  
Opponents to the change claimed that moving away from the WCF would significantly 
remove the business-like benefits of cost visibility and total cost recovery.  Additionally, 
as the General Accounting Office (GAO) would later write, some thought that the Navy 
was simply trying to avoid bearing a greater share costs under the WCF based on paying 
for a share of the maintenance activity’s overhead (GAO/NSIAD-99-199, 1999).   
Nonetheless, given the CNO’s RMP mandate for regionalization, the Navy 
pressed on with the Pearl Harbor pilot under the MF structure.  The CNO approved the 
consolidation in August of 1997, but by December, the Deputy Secretary of Defense 
issued Program Budget Decision Number 404 requiring the Navy to develop test plan 
metrics for measuring the pilot’s benefits (Ibid).  So, in April of 1998, the Navy issued a 
draft of the Pearl Harbor test plan, providing five metrics1, and by the end of the month 
the consolidation took place.  Less than two months later, however, the usefulness of 
these metrics came into question under the DoD Assistant Inspector General, subjecting 
the test plan to numerous revisions and additions (Ibid).  Finally, nearly five months after 
the consolidation took place, the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) approved the 
Pearl Harbor pilot plan under nine new metrics2 and PHNSY became mission-funded 
under the pilot (Ibid).   
In September of 1999, however, the pilot’s results came under scrutiny 
when the General Accounting Office (GAO) submitted to Congress its Status of the 
Navy’s Pearl Harbor Pilot Project.  This report stated that data had been gathered for 
only five of the nine metrics, that of these five only two showed preliminary results that 
met or exceeded expectations, that two fell slightly short of expectations, and that one                                                  
1 These five metrics measured cost per unit output, production efficiency and resource utilization, material 
readiness of PACFLT ships, customer satisfaction, and quality (GAO/NSIAD-99-199, 1999).   
2 The approved metrics were (1) Total cost of a production shop, in direct labor hours (DLH) of work 
delivered to the customer, (2) Total available labor hours expended to deliver a production shop, in DLH to 
the customer, (3) Total Current Ship Maintenance Program (CSMP) work items completed during the fiscal 
year, (4) Total CSMP work items in backlog, (5) Schedule adherence of CNO maintenance projects, (6) 
Rework index for CNO maintenance projects (labor hours to correct deficiencies over total DLH), (7) 
Activity work schedule integrity index (scheduled labor days over actual), (8) Casualty Reports caused by 
activity work, and (9) Earned value, involving statistical analysis (Ibid). 
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metric indicated no improvement.3  While it recognized that the pilot was not yet 
complete, the GAO recommended that steps be taken to address these issues.   
The Navy responded in May of 2000, submitting a report to Congress 
showing that four of the nine metrics had met expectations, three had maintained results, 
and two were inconclusive with corrective actions being taken.  Aside from the metrics, 
the Navy wrote that the Pearl Harbor pilot had achieved the goals of the RMP, allowing 
PHNSY&IMF to complete Fleet priority work with a minimized workforce.  In addition 
to these benefits, the Navy reported that it had met or exceeded expectations, improving 
workforce flexibility and customer satisfaction and reducing the maintenance 
infrastructure (U.S. Navy Report to Congress, 2000). 
Given this assessment of the Pearl Harbor pilot program and the standing 
CNO directive, the Navy then began to lay the groundwork for consolidation at PSNS.  
By February of 2000, it set up the Northwest Maintenance Integration Oversight Team 
(MIOT), which consisted of four two-star admirals and three Senior Executive Service 
(SES) civilians (Consolidation Manager A Interview, 2004).  The MIOT would provide 
oversight and guidance during the planning and implementation phases of the PSNS 
pilot, as well as the first full year of operation (Ibid).   
Despite this early preparation, when the Navy submitted its budget for 
Fiscal Year 2001 with Puget Sound under a MF structure, OSD provided marks that 
denied the transition.  After significant time in the reclama process4 and high-level 
discussions between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense, a joint Navy 
and OSD team was formed to study the cost and benefits of the transition (Harrell, 2004).  
In the end, however, the issue remained at a stalemate:  the Puget Sound pilot would not 
yet be implemented. 
By January 2001, the GAO revisited the issue of Pearl Harbor metrics, 
submitting its report, Key Financial Issues for Consolidations at Pearl Harbor and 
Elsewhere Are Still Unresolved.  In this report, the GAO concluded that the workers and 
                                                 
3 Metrics (2) and (5) improved, meeting or exceeding expectations; metrics (1) and (4) fell short; metric (3) 
showed no improvement.  Metric (6) required more time to develop data, and metrics (7) through (9) 
showed inconclusive results because the Navy did not plan to gather the required data (GAO/NSIAD-99-
199, 1999). 
4 A reclama is a formal appeal to a service comptroller or OSD marks, which are tentative budget decisions 
(AT&L Knowledge Sharing System, 2004).   
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facilities at Pearl Harbor were being used more effectively but that the pilot’s nine 
metrics “provide an inconclusive picture of its overall accomplishments in achieving 
greater efficiencies and lowering ship maintenance costs” (GAO-01-19, 2001).  Before 
the Navy issued a response to this report, however, the events of September 11th, 2001 
would soon shock the world and alter the face of U.S. Defense, temporarily putting the 
issue of metrics on hold. 
d. Additional Environmental Trends 
While the end of the Cold War signaled a change in the Navy’s strategic 
outlook on maintenance, September 11th, 2001 helped to solidify that change.  It also 
supported the service’s argument for consolidating maintenance facilities under the 
mission funding structure.  With declaration of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
following this event, the DoD faced a prolonged conflict spread across the globe.  By 
giving greater control over maintenance workflows to the Fleet, then, the Navy could 
better meet the demands of the GWOT. 
In addition to the GWOT, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) further 
strengthened the Navy’s argument for maintenance consolidation.  As tensions over the 
Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions escalated by the end of 2002, the Navy continued 
to work toward further consolidations, and on January 7, 2003 it received authorization 
from OSD to proceed with an additional two-year consolidation pilot program on a MF 
basis.  Program Budget Decision 700C gave this authorization, requiring the Navy to 
work with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) to develop pilot performance measures 
on retaining total cost visibility under MF (Harrell Phone Conversation, 2004).  Since 
preparations had already begun at PSNS and because the Pearl Harbor pilot had already 
established a learning curve for COMPACFLT, the Navy chose Puget Sound to conduct 
the pilot (Ibid).   
Leading up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, the Navy soon 
found itself deploying over 70% of its ships and 50% of its submarines to meet the urgent 
need of naval forces overseas (NAVSEA “All Hands” Message, 2003).  While the 
Navy’s existing maintenance facilities were able to quickly deploy these ships and 
submarines, it came at a cost:  together, the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets spent 
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approximately $2 Billion in Fiscal Year 2003 Supplemental ship maintenance funding 
associated with the cost of war (Public Law 108-11, 2003).   
The Global War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom thus created a 
trend that would change the Navy’s internal technology.  Fighting a prolonged war on all 
fronts and facing rapidly escalating conflicts, the Navy saw that it could not go on with 
business as usual:  rapid responsiveness became a critical capability that aimed at 
increasing the Navy’s effectiveness.  This need to surge deploy the Fleet would soon alter 
the Navy’s strategy, providing further evidence for its argument to implement a mission-
funded shipyard. 
e. The NAVSEA Mandate 
In his Guidance for 2003, the CNO established a Navy-wide vision for 
transformation.  Subsequently, in March of 2003, the CNO released a message on 
creating a “culture of readiness” (Commander, Fleet Forces Command Norfolk, VA 
Naval Message, 231400Z May 03) that directed the development of deployment cycles 
that would improve the responsiveness of the Fleet to project full combat power.  Two 
months later, the Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) released a message 
outlining the Navy’s Fleet Response Plan (FRP).  This transformational strategy 
described steps to give Navy ships and aircraft the ability to surge deploy and meet 
operational requirements around the globe (Ibid).  It would lay the foundation for changes 
not only in operations but also in support functions such as maintenance. 
The NAVSEA Guidance for Strategy 2003, following the CNO guidance, 
introduced maintenance initiatives to support the Navy’s transformation (NSY 100 Day 
Transformation Team, 2003).  In particular, NAVSEA’s One Shipyard initiative 
mandated the shipyards to adopt the Regional Maintenance Plan’s concept of creating a 
single maintenance process, extending the idea to include partnerships with private 
industry shipyards.  The aim of the initiative was to provide a single theoretical provider 
for the Fleet, giving Navy maintenance the ability to meet emergent needs (Sherman, 
2003).   
2. PSNS Design Changes 
With evidence of a clearly different world environment, mandates from the CNO 
and NAVSEA, and authorization from OSD, the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard pilot 
35 
program would begin after almost three years of being put on hold.  Just as it did at the 
Pearl Harbor shipyard, the Navy directed two major design changes for PSNS:  structural 
consolidations and the financial management shift to mission funding.  On May 15, 2003, 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility (PSNS&IMF) would 
be created, consolidating D-level facilities at the shipyard with I-level facilities at the 
IMF.  Secondly, less than five months later on October 1, 2003, PSNS would change its 
financial management system from WCF to MF (COMPACFLT/COMNAVSEA Joint 
Letter, 2003).  On that same day, Vice Admiral Balisle, COMNAVSEA, signed a 
directive that added more organizations to this major consolidation, further altering the 
PSNS structure:  Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair, Puget Sound 
(SUPSHIP)5, Fleet Technical Support Center, Pacific Detachment Everett (FTSCPAC 
Det Everett), and portions of Commander, Naval Surface Group Pacific Northwest 
(CNSGPNW) N43 Maintenance Staff (Orzalli Interview, 2004).  In total, the 
consolidated activity would amass a total of over 10,000 personnel by May 20, 2004 
(Ibid). 
a. Structural Change  
While it was the second naval shipyard to merge with nearby intermediate 
maintenance facilities, PSNS would be the first of its kind based on the size and scope of 
its consolidation.  By increasing its manning to close to 10,000 civilians and military 
personnel, PSNS would undertake a consolidation well beyond the size of the Pearl 
Harbor consolidated activity, which currently stands at approximately 4,400 people 
(Depot Profiles, JDMAG Website, 2004).   
Early in the planning stages, in August of 1999, the shipyard adapted a 
CONOPS similar to that of the Pearl Harbor pilot:  PSNS&IMF would be 
organizationally assigned to COMPACFLT as its primary customer and source of funds 
and would retain COMNAVSEA as overall manager of shipyard operations 
(COMPACFLT/ COMNAVSEA Joint Letter, 2003).  Figure 4 depicts the structure of the 
PSNS&IMF consolidation, with the original organizations and their respective reporting 
seniors in dotted lines. 
                                                 
5 SUPSHIP, responsible for the procurement and administration of new construction and ship repair 
contracts with private sector shipyards in the Pacific Northwest, was the major part of this consolidation 
(NAVSEA Website, 2004).  
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Figure 4.   PSNS&IMF Consolidation Structure [After: PSNS&IMF Comptroller 
Mission Funding Presentation, 2003]     
 
Before the consolidation, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard’s primary mission 
was to conduct D-level overhaul and repair on several different classes of Navy ships and 
submarines (Depot Profiles, JDMAG Website, 2004).  As shown in Figure 4 above, 
civilian personnel formed an overwhelming majority of the workforce at 99.5%.  These 
personnel took on most of the tasks and jobs of the shipyard, from the shop floors all the 
way up to senior levels, typically retiring with 30 to 40 years of service at the yard (NW 
Regional Maintenance Coordinator letter, 2004).  Navy enlisted Sailors did not directly 
perform maintenance for PSNS, although a detachment of SIMA Everett worked within 
the PSNS facilities (Ibid).  Based on the complexity and wide range of the maintenance 
performed at the shipyard, its turnaround time for ships and submarines depended on the 
type of availability and ranged from nine months up to two years or more (Ibid).  Figure 5 






































































Figure 5.   PSNS Organizational Chart [After: PSNS&IMF Welcome Aboard Package, 
2004] 
 
The largest activity that merged with PSNS was the Naval Intermediate 
Maintenance Facility, Pacific Northwest (NAVIMFAC PACNORWEST).6  This activity 
was created under Phase 1 of the RMP in 1998 from the consolidation of the Trident 
Refit Facility (TRF) in Bangor, Washington and the SIMAs in Everett and Bremerton 
(IMF Website Home Page, 2004).  The IMF’s primary mission was to conduct 
maintenance on the West Coast Trident ballistic missile submarine fleet7, producing an 
average 22-day turnaround for these submarines (Barge Interview, 2004).  As Figure 5 
shows above, it consisted of about 45.5% civilian workers, a considerably different 
makeup than PSNS.  Here, unlike at PSNS, Sailors and civilian personnel worked closely 
together on specialized maintenance tasks specific to Trident submarines (Ibid).  Having 
longer tenure than the military, the civilians typically had the same number of years of 
                                                 
6 In addition to the Bangor IMF, the consolidation included the Nuclear Regional Maintenance Department 
(NRMD) at Bangor, the NAVIMFAC Everett Detachment, the PSNS Engineering Library, and the PSNS 
Detachments in Boston, Massachusetts, and North Island, California (Commander, Puget Sound Naval 
Shipyard and Commanding Officer, Naval Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pacific Northwest Joint 
Letter, 2003). 
7 This maintenance consisted of all shipboard maintenance other than on the Trident missiles themselves. 
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experience at the job as the people at PSNS (NW Regional Maintenance Coordinator 


































Figure 6.   IMF Organizational Chart [After: IMF Chief Information Officer, 2004] 
 
Between PSNS and IMF, people’s skills, abilities, and knowledge differed 
based on differences in workflows.  At the shipyard, employees worked on multiple lines 
of long-term production spanning the entire spectrum of the Navy’s ships and submarines 
(JDMAG Website, 2004).  On the other hand, IMF employees worked on one specific 
product line with a relatively quick turnaround time:  the Trident submarine.  Further, 
based on the strategic nature of these assets, the schedule for maintenance was even more 
stringent.8  This describes the high priority mission of getting Tridents fixed and out to 
sea on time to serve their strategic mission.  As a result, this made employees at IMF 
more specialized in their tasks than those at PSNS.  Workflows also differed based on 
differing planning systems and infrastructure.   
Unlike the Pearl Harbor consolidated activity, which was able to fully 
integrate I-level and D-level facilities and systems (Barge Interview, 2004), PSNS&IMF 
would have two separate, major commands:  the IMF CO retained command of his 
organization through the consolidation but would be subordinate to the shipyard 
commander (Commander, Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and Commanding Officer, Naval 
Intermediate Maintenance Facility, Pacific Northwest Joint Letter, 2003).  This was 
necessary again due to the strategic nature of the IMF’s primary mission of maintaining 
                                                 
8 Admiral Williams, Commander Submarine Group Nine (COMSUBGRU 9), reflected on this importance 
as maintaining the “Conveyor Belt of Tridents” (Barge Interview, 2004). 
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these submarines and getting their strategic payloads out to sea.  Overall, these 
differences would cause issues that would have to be overcome in the consolidation and 
that would complicate the transition to mission funding.  Figure 7 displays the 
organizational structure of PSNS&IMF based on the in-process consolidations, simplified 















Figure 7.   PSNS&IMF Organizational Chart [After: Northwest Regional Maintenance 
Center Establishment Plan, 2004] 
 
b. Financial Management Change  
The people of PSNS had a long history of working under a revolving fund 
such as the WCF, having used one form of the funding structure since the shipyard’s 
establishment in 1891.9  At IMF, on the other hand, maintenance activities had been 
mission-funded since its major parent organization, the TRF, was formed in July of 1981 
(Barge Interview, 2004).  The consolidation between PSNS and IMF, then, combined two 
organizations whose people differed in mindsets and expectations.  Under the WCF, 
people understood that whatever work they performed would be funded by the customer.  
Under MF, people understood that, with limited funds, work had to be prioritized in order 
to utilize their scarce funds wisely.  Further, each set of people worked under different, 
specialized financial and information systems (discussed below) that had developed over 
the years; systems that were tailored to each organization’s work process flows.  
                                                 
9 The Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) is one of five separate funds that make up the Defense 
Working Capital Fund (DWCF), which also includes the Army, Air Force, Defense-Wide, and Defense 
Commissary WCFs.  The DWCF, with Defense Commissary added in 1999, was borne of the Defense 
Business Operations Fund (DBOF) in 1996, which was a merger of individual revolving industrial and 
stock funds used prior to 1991 (Candreva, 2003).    
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Altogether, these differences would describe the changes that personnel at PSNS would 
have to make in their transition to mission funding. 
The Puget Sound pilot differed significantly from the Pearl Harbor pilot in 
the amount of WCF projects that were carried over from before the transition to MF.  
(These projects were works in progress that began under the WCF and that were being 
carried over into the MF structure until completion.)  Compared to the one carryover ship 
availability at Pearl, PSNS&IMF had eight.  With approximately 70% of its work being 
WCF reimbursable (compared to the approximate 20% at Pearl), PSNS faced a major 
challenge based on the differing information systems between WCF and MF 
(PSNS&IMF Comptroller Interview B, 2004).  This major difference complicated the 
workflows of PSNS. 
Captain John Orzalli, PSNS&IMF commander, explained in a May 6, 
2004 interview this workload as one of the major learning experiences for the shipyard in 
its transition to mission funding:  
This first year, because we had so many Working Capital Fund carryover 
projects, we’re working to multiple sets of rules all at the same time and it 
makes it very difficult to try to figure out the impact of changing to 
mission funding, as well as how viable it is as a long-term funding 
strategy.  (Orzalli Interview, 2004)10 
 
This complexity not only challenged upper PSNS management but made 
workflows in the comptroller office (Code 600 at PSNS) especially difficult.  As 
discussed previously, one of the characteristics of the WCF is its high cost visibility.  To 
provide this detailed tracking of costs, the WCF shipyard used a legacy program called 
the Cost Application Database (COST), a proprietary and labor-intensive accounting 
system (Anonymous A Interview, 2004).  On the other hand, mission-funded government 
activities used the Standard Accounting and Reporting System, Field Level (STARS-FL) 
system.  Given the large amount of carryover projects at PSNS and the complexity of 
process patches between the COST and STARS-FL (Ibid), converting WCF accounts into 
a MF format (as discussed later in the chapter) would cause particular challenges. 
                                                 
10 All subsequent quotes from the shipyard commander come from this May 6 interview. 
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Another area of workflow complexity came from the differing 
maintenance planning systems used by PSNS and IMF.  The shipyard used the Advanced 
Industrial Management (AIM) system to manage long-term shipyard availabilities.  
While it also used AIM Express for shorter availabilities, neither of these systems was 
compatible with the IMF’s Logistics Data System (LDS), which was designed 
specifically for Trident refit planning and management (Orzalli, 2004).  These 
fundamental differences in maintenance planning systems created more complexity for 
financial management flows as accounting personnel attempted to bridge gaps between 
AIM, LDS, COST, and STARS.   
This incompatibility also presented issues for the PSNS&IMF comptroller, 
who worked to control the shipyard’s rate of obligation.11  The patchwork of fixes 
between the PSNS, IMF, WCF, and MF caused significant delays between commitment 
and expenditure.  Providing an example, the comptroller stated that ordering material for 
a carryover WCF project produces a commitment of funds that must go through both 
COST and STARS-FL, and when coupled by procurement lead times, this could cause a 
delay anywhere from 14 to 20 months (Comptroller B, 2004). 
The transition to MF also completely changed some of the shipyard’s 
workflows.  As discussed earlier, activities under the WCF have an incentive to attract 
additional work to lower the per-unit allocation of overhead, lower customer rates, and 
maintain high workforce utilization.  In fact, WCF shipyards such as the former PSNS 
have created Process Shops to seek out extra work to this end.  Under MF, however, 
PSNS&IMF now has a fixed yearly budget, so seeking out extra work makes no sense.  
Although doing so would lead to financial success under WCF, it could potentially lead 
to legal violations under MF by the Anti-Deficiency Act12 (ADA).  
With the end of this practice, workforce management also had to change.  
Under the WCF, the shipyard earned revenue by billing the customer for direct labor                                                  
11 Under the MF structure, appropriated funds go through a series of three stages:  1) Commitment, which 
is an administrative reservation of funds that carries no legal binding; 2) Obligation, the legal reservation of 
appropriated funds, which is analogous to a written check from your checkbook, and; 3) Expenditure, 
which liquidates the obligation and actually draws funds from the U.S. Treasury.  The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) regulates the rate of spending by the executive departments and agencies 
through what are called apportionments.  Activities funded by appropriations such as PSNS&IMF must, 
therefore, carefully control their rate of expenditures. 
12 Under the Anti-Deficiency Act (31 U.S.C. § 1341), an obligation cannot be made in advance of or over 
the amount provided for in a congressional appropriation 
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hours, creating an incentive for supervisors to keep their workers busy with billable tasks.  
This, then, created an incentive to attract additional work.  While no consideration was 
made about the importance of this extra work under WCF, work under MF, on the other 
hand, had to be prioritized.  Managers would no longer seek to keep workers busy with 
excess work, but they would employ what the PSNS comptroller has called workforce 
reconstitution:  during periods of low productivity, employees must engage in training, 
proficiency work, or take leave (PSNS&IMF Comptroller Navy Working Capital Fund 
Presentation, 2004).  Because the workforce would have already been paid for by the 
fiscal year appropriation, looking for work and keeping the workforce employed on 
additional jobs would only incur further obligations, potentially leading to an ADA 
violation. 
Materiel purchasing practices also had to change.  Under the WCF, a 
shipyard only charges costs when material is used.  Given the flexibility of the revolving 
fund, material can be ordered via multiple paths to ensure availability and can either be 
accumulated as a ready reserve of inventory parts or simply be returned and not impact 
the financial position of the shipyard (Ibid).  Under MF, however, funds are obligated 
once material is ordered, not when it is consumed.  Ordering the same part through 
multiple paths, then, would accelerate the drain of funds and could also lead to an ADA 
violation.   
The measure for financial success at PSNS would also change.  Although 
both financial structures are constrained by budgets, the MF budget is a fixed amount 
while the WCF budget can expand and contract according to workload.  This is because 
while the entire MF budget is fixed during the budgeting process, only the labor rate 
charged to customers is fixed in the WCF budget; the level of activity under WCF, then, 
can expand and contract during the year of execution.  Lastly, where success under the 
WCF meant breaking even, under MF, PSNS would have to prioritize work in order for it 
to operate under constrained resources.  This change in mindsets provided one of the 





C.   IMPLEMENTATION OF MISSION FUNDING AT PSNS 
With the change to mission funding, PSNS faced a strategic issue:  How would it 
transition away from a form of funding it had been using for over a century?  To answer 
this question, the shipyard commander would have to formulate his own strategy for 
change.  The shipyard had received its mandates and the authorization for the transition; 
how exactly it was to implement its transformation rested in shipyard and IMF 
management’s hands.   
Leaving the details of the transition to the activity was completely consistent with 
military form:  as the activity’s comptroller aptly put it, “we [the military] salute smartly 
and we understand what our bosses want” (PSNS&IMF Comptroller Interview A, 2004).  
Further, given the vast organizational differences between the consolidations at Puget 
Sound and Pearl Harbor, no single manual or procedure could provide the steps required 
to perform the transition.  With Pearl Harbor undergoing the Navy’s first such pilot under 
the RMP, the shipyard commander looked to learn from PHNSY. 
1. Shipyard Commander Strategy 
The shipyard commander immediately set out to implement change in a deliberate 
and gradual manner when he took command in September of 2002.  He had learned of 
transitional chaos at Pearl Harbor that came from its attempt to merge all of its shops and 
codes immediately and concurrently.  Given this, he turned his focus onto his people.  
The shipyard commander, in a May 6, 2004 interview, outlined his strategy:   
…the way that you implement change…the first thing you do is you 
identify where you’re going, you make sure everyone knows where we’re 
going, and where their piece fits in, how they are a part of this.  You need 
to take behaviors that support the change and reinforce them, and then you 
have to constantly go back and look and make sure you’re getting to 
where you want to go. 
 
Even before the consolidation, the shipyard commander began a series of 
communications initiatives aimed at aligning the organization with the change.  Looking 
to implement the changes slowly for employees, he employed media such as all-hands 
calls, the “Commander’s Corner” in the shipyard’s bi-weekly newsletter, videos shown in 
the maintenance shops, and even visiting shops and speaking during their regularly 
scheduled morning meetings.  He also worked closely with his Congressional and Public 
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Affairs Officer (PAO) to create internal and external channels of communication through 
the PSNS&IMF Transformation Communication Plan.  This plan outlined marketing 
strategies for the transformation, for both the consolidation and the shift to mission 
funding.  In particular, it included letting the “work force know if things start to go south 
[sic] and what needs to be done” (PSNS&IMF Transformation Communication Plan, 
2004).  While working steadily and gradually toward complete consolidation, the 
shipyard commander continued to execute this communication plan in weekly meetings, 
monthly expanded-staff meetings, and during daily tours of different sections of the 
shipyard. 
Through his personal addresses, Orzalli repeatedly talked of such overarching and 
external influences as Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Fleet Response Plan, linking 
those environmental demands to the One Shipyard initiative and talking of the need to 
transform the shipyard into a provider for the nation’s needs.  He communicated the 
various initiatives in place at the shipyard that would change work processes, particularly 
with the shift to MF and the consolidation of the various maintenance activities.  He 
would then go further, tying the change to specific shipyard workers and maintenance 
projects (Orzalli, 2004).  Breaking down the change to the individual employees in this 
way, the shipyard commander aimed at certain benefits:  
…when you get people excited about change, if you can demonstrate to 
the people that do the work the benefits to them, and get them on board, 
they will fuel [the change effort] and they will go faster than you are able 
to keep up.   
 
The vision that the shipyard commander painted for his workforce was different 
from the shipyard’s previously posted website statement:   
Our vision is to provide Navy-wide best-value services including small, 
individual jobs and complex maintenance/modernization packages.  
Partnered combinations of public, private, and military assets integrated to 
maximize available resources will accomplish these services 
(http://www.psns.navy.mil/). 
 
The shipyard commander’s vision of the people of PSNS working to meet the 
global needs of the Fleet was one wrought of the shipyard’s mandates and environmental 
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trends.  More specifically, it was created from the change in its customer focus that came 
with the shift to mission funding.  The Fleet played a much bigger part in the shipyard’s 
funding.  Further, the shipyard no longer had the incentive to seek job orders from other 
customers.  This, then, changed its focus and vision away from providing “Navy-wide 
best-value services.”   
The shipyard’s goals consequently changed.  No longer did management seek to 
accomplish as much work as it could to spread its overhead costs; rather, it looked to 
instill fiscal discipline throughout the organization given its constrained resources.  Code 
600 played a large role in accomplishing this goal.  (This is discussed later in the 
chapter.)   
The shipyard commander also took these communications personally, expressing 
concern over his people and the honesty of his message:  “You can tell them anything, 
but if your actions don’t reflect what you’re telling them then you’ve actually done a  
disservice.”  With this sense of ownership over his people, Captain Orzalli also 
articulated that the most difficult thing he had to deal with in the transition was 
attempting to alleviate fear: 
Change.  Everybody loves change, right?  No.  Change brings 
uncertainty…What does uncertainty do?  It causes fear. So how do you 
alleviate that?  How do you alleviate fear?  You have to communicate.  
And when you think you’re done communicating you have to 
communicate some more.   
 
Despite his extensive communication program, the shipyard commander set out to 
implement the change with the understanding that his job would not end once the first 
fiscal year was completed:  “Am I satisfied?  I can never be satisfied.  We have to keep 
moving.  And…it will be through constantly working on it and never being satisfied that 
we [will go] where we need to go.” 
2. IMF Commanding Officer Strategy  
The shipyard commander met several times a week with the IMF Commanding 
Officer (CO), Captain Barge.  As commander of the IMF, Captain Barge had a vested 
interest in keeping the Trident Conveyor Belt moving.  However, leading an organization 
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with a history of mission-funded maintenance, he brought different ideas to the table and 
contributed to a unified command philosophy.  Sharing similar views about the 
transformation with the IMF CO explains: 
You can’t tell an organization, ‘Get more efficient!’ without addressing 
fears of the people who are there, which is:  ‘Efficiency means fewer 
people, how are we going to do this?  Are we going to do this through 
attrition?  Are going to do it through a RIF?’  …you have to know what 
that answer is.  And it could be any of the above...That involves knowing 
what the strategy is and then communicating it (Barge Interview, 2004).13  
 
The IMF CO put the same emphasis on communications as did the shipyard 
commander, focusing particularly on employee and management fear.  His strategy for 
the change, though, was not only to educate his people through communication but also 
to channel their fear into constructive work:  “Change is a fact.  So you can resist it and 
be left behind and be ruled over, or you can participate in it and influence how it’s going 
to go and hopefully the outcome will be better for everybody all around.”  He described 
the philosophy that he tried to pass on to his people:  “I’ve tried to make it pretty clear to 
the workforce that we are in an environment of change, so they cannot expect not to 
change.”  
With the goal of collaborate or be left behind in mind, Captain Barge provided 
his input into the transformation effort, stating, “One thing I’ve worked for is a 
commitment to take the best practice from the organization [PSNS&IMF] regardless of 
which one [PSNS or IMF] comes in with it.”  Best practices meant finding processes that 
would work well with both the shipyard and the IMF, each of which had a widely 
different organizational structure.  He not only carried this message to PSNS but also 
communicated it within his organization, utilizing his Command Information Officer to 
employ a communications plan that included internal and external web sites, newsletters, 
and Captain’s Call.  The IMF CO also met monthly with his general foreman and 
regularly with his Department Heads, “hammering that message home.  I’ve told them to 
  
                                                 
13 RIF is a Reduction In Force, or furlough.  Further, all subsequent quotes from the IMF CO come from 
this May 6 interview. 
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hold to best practices and not to sacrifice the mission just for the sake of change.  But, in 
areas where the mission still works and there’s some gain to be achieved, they should 
change.”   
  Throughout his efforts in the transformation, Captain Barge agreed with Captain 
Orzalli that the transition would not be a short-term task.  The IMF CO explained his 
long-term strategy:  “Communicating effectively…that’s a never-ending challenge.  You 
could always do better.  Even if we declare victory on 01 October 04, we’re still going to 
continue to adjust.  And that’s a good thing.” 
3. Shipyard Leadership  
Before the consolidation, the shipyard commander met regularly with two groups 
of leaders:  his leadership council and his department and office heads.  The leadership 
council consisted of the shipyard commander, comptroller, operations department head, 
production resources department head, nuclear engineering and planning manager, non-
nuclear engineering and planning manager, human resources manager, and the shipyard 
commander’s executive director.  This small, “very informal” (Orzalli, 2004) group of 
leaders met with him twice every week to discuss both long- and short-term issues.  With  
the consolidation and transition to mission funding, this council served as one part of the 
shipyard commander’s leadership core, involving players that were critical to the 
transition. 
Department and office heads made up the other part of the shipyard commander’s 
leadership core.  He met with these managers once a month on a staggered basis, meeting 
with at least one of them every week, discussing “current issues, but also where we’re 
going.”  The shipyard commander also conducted strategic planning sessions with these 
managers.  In fact, the shipyard commander invited every department and office head to a 
morning session at his home to collaborate in redefining the organization’s mission, 
among other strategic elements.  From that meeting, the group developed the following 
mission statement:  “One Team Ensuring Freedom by Fixing Ships and Training Sailors.”  
This statement shows that based on the change to mission funding, the shipyard’s mission 





While PSNS management formulated its plan, the shipyard’s stakeholders began 
to prepare for the coming transition.  Type Commanders14, COMPACFLT, 
representatives from NAVSEA Headquarters, the local Supervisor of Shipbuilding 
(SUPSHIP), and high level managers from PSNS formed the Local Board of Directors 
(LBOD) on May 22 and began to meet at least monthly via Video Telephone Conference 
(VTC).  The purpose of this standing board was to assess the priorities for the 
consolidated activity.  As discussed earlier, the new funding system would provide finite 
resources requiring prioritization of shipyard work; this board would provide the means 
by which maintenance customers could talk to PSNS&IMF, the maintenance provider.  
The shipyard commander explained that with the LBOD, all of the activity’s customers 
and stakeholders come together to “understand what the issues are and then how to work 
through them.”  This body, he explained further, was a concept taken from Pearl Harbor.   
5. Consolidation Managers 
Early on in the implementation, the shipyard commander designated a temporary 
task force of two consolidation program managers, each one an experienced manager 
from PSNS and the IMF.  These two individuals would later form the Transition 
Management Team (TMT), an oversight team that would lead the assessment of 
functional areas.  This effort, begun in August of 2003, looked at the differences in 
processes between IMF and PSNS, breaking these down into 12 functional areas.  Teams 
were then formed with members from both the former PSNS and former IMF to work on 
performing a “gap analysis” (Orzalli, 2004) between the two major organizations and to 
create Plans of Action and Milestones (POA&Ms) for the transition.  (Figure 8 depicts 
the organization of the functional area teams.)   
                                                 
14 Type Commanders with a stake in PSNS are:  Commander, Naval Surface Force U.S. Pacific Fleet 
(SURFPAC); Commander, Submarine Force U.S. Pacific Fleet (SUBPAC), and; Commander, Naval Air 
Force U.S. Pacific Fleet (AIRPAC) 
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Figure 8.   PSNS Functional Area Teams [After: Maintenance Integration Team Listing, 
2004] 
 
These teams met weekly with the shipyard commander and IMF CO and reported 
to them with any unresolved issues.  If still unresolved, the commanders would report to 
the MIOT for resolution, as previously discussed.  The shipyard and IMF commanders 
employed these teams in order to identify and integrate processes that were duplicated 
between the two organizations.  At the same time, processes that needed to remain unique 
to each organization would be kept separate.  
Metrics were of particular concern to the IMT.  Having gone through the 
difficulties of trying to determine appropriate metrics for the Pearl Harbor pilot program, 
the offices of the CNO, NAVSEA, PACFLT, the shipyard, and the IMF each looked for 
metrics of success for the Puget Sound pilot (Consolidation Manager A Interview, 2004).  
The metrics team produced 12 metrics to satisfy these requirements.15  Consolidation 
Manager A commented on these metrics: 
Everyone wants things measured.  They’re not looking for opinion, they’re 
looking for facts, measurable conclusions.  And so everyone is directing 
that metrics be developed for whichever element that they’re concerned 
with (Consolidation Manager A, 2004).   
 
                                                 
15 These metrics are:  1) Activity Total Cost Per Total Direct Labor Man-Day Delivered, 1A) Activity Cost 
to Deliver a Production Labor Man-Day, 3) Facilities and Equipment, 4) CNO Availability Schedule 
Adherence, 5) Ships Force Workload, 6) Military Utilization and Skill Enhancement, 7) Capability and 
Capacity, 8) Quality Measure for Consolidation, 9) Maintenance of Workforce Proficiency, 10) Quality of 
Life, 11) Command Resources, 12) Safety.  No data was available for metrics 2) and 2A). (Pacific 
Northwest Regional Maintenance Center Website, 2004) 
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The metrics team develops these metrics, meeting every two weeks to brainstorm 
these measures.  Nonetheless, with these consolidation managers and integration teams in 
place, the responsibility for the implementation of mission funding rested heavily on the 
comptroller staff.  As the Consolidation Manager B explained:   
They spent a lot of time educating managers and supervisors on ‘How do 
you make this work?’  Then after the transition, for the first six months of 
their campaign for mission funding, they spent tons of time and effort in 
monitoring that on a week-in-week-out basis, so people know not to 
overspend.  And I would credit them, the comptroller office, with just all 
the credit in the world…because of the approach they were taking 
(Consolidation Manager B Interview, 2004). 
 
D.   RESPONSES TO THE CHANGE PROCESS 
The first task that PSNS faced following the consolidation ceremony was 
preparing for October 1st, when the consolidated activity was scheduled to transition to 
mission funding.  Within five months, the shipyard’s financial systems had to be aligned.  
In particular, computer systems between the IMF and PSNS had to be interfaced, 
merging COST, STARS-FL, AIM, and LDS in order for the consolidated activity to work 
as one.  The shipyard commander describes it as a “spaghetti diagram for all the 
computer patches that have to be in place in order to make it work.”  The Consolidation 
Program Managers and personnel from the Code 600 set out to make it work. 
On several occasions before and after the transition to MF, representatives of 
Code 600, the comptroller, Consolidation Program Managers, and other managers 
traveled to Pearl Harbor.  Supervisors averaged four to five working days while 
principals in accounting and budget averaged eight to 10 days (Anonymous A, 2004).  
Only portions of Code 600 could make these trips since the remaining staff had to attend 
to matters at PSNS.  Given that their sister shipyard had gone through the transition to 
MF using similar Information Technology systems, these representatives took a look at 
the patches that PHNSY&IMF had in place with the goal of bringing home some lessons 
learned.  Code 600 also came with prepared questions that had been developed by the 
comptroller staff remaining at PSNS.   
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The Pearl Harbor comptroller staff provided training during these visits, 
consisting of Power Point presentations followed by Question and Answer sessions.  
They would also visit Puget Sound on several occasions to aid in the transition.  Further, 
close communication between comptroller staffs proved to be valuable.  PSNS Code 600 
found, however, that there was no detailed written documentation at Pearl Harbor on how 
the WCF and MF information systems were merged:  information relayed to PSNS staff 
came mainly from five years of personally accumulated knowledge on the Pearl Harbor 
financial systems (Anonymous A, 2004).   
Nonetheless, the PSNS comptroller implemented a rigorous training plan aimed at 
communicating and educating Code 600 personnel and shipyard middle management on 
the fiscal discipline required under MF.  All department heads received three to four 
training sessions, each lasting 30-45 minutes.  Every funds administrator (personnel 
authorized to act on behalf of the comptroller) participated in two sessions, each two to 
three hours in length (Comptroller B, 2004). They also underwent re-qualification and re-
testing on the principles of MF.  Further, the comptroller targeted a broader audience by 
writing several articles in the shipyard newspaper, e-mails on Read and Learn topics, and 
through extensive use of the shipyard intranet (Ibid).  Because the people of PSNS had 
had a long history working in the WCF, the comptroller understood that communicating 
the change would require massive effort.  
As this training went on, however, personnel within Code 600 began to feel the 
pressures of the transition.  They began to face the everyday realities of the change to MF 
and found that life at work would drastically change.   
1. WCF Carryover 
A seven-year comptroller employee (Anonymous A) explained that personnel 
within the department had worked 12 hours a day and seven days a week from mid-
August to mid-October, at times until midnight, in the attempt to make the transition in 
accounting systems.  This was due to the level of detail involved in converting WCF 
accounts into a format usable to the STARS-FL system, as discussed earlier in the 
chapter.  After the transition to MF was made, carryover projects in the WCF still used 
the COST system.  However, as the she explained in an interview, due to the 
incompatibility of the COST and STARS-FL systems, manual workarounds were 
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required to identify and collect overhead information from COST.  This resulted in errors 
that required significant amounts of rework to correct.  With 572 carryover WCF 
Customer Order Acceptance Record (COAR) accounts (Anonymous A, 2004), this made 
the task particularly difficult and labor intensive.    
2. Customer Relations 
This employee also expressed concern over the change in customer relations.  
Under mission funding, she found she had to employ different ways of dealing with 
customers:  “When a customer calls asking, ‘How’s my account?’…” (Anonymous A, 
2004) all the employee could do was shrug.  Based on the complexity of data processes 
between COST and STARS-FL, she felt that she could not give the customer an informed 
answer. 
Another employee (Anonymous B) had also worked within the comptroller office 
for seven years.  She explained the difficulties she faced when customers would call to 
order services from the shipyard:  under the WCF, she could simply accept an order and 
begin processing it; under MF, she felt helpless having to turn away the customer.  She 
just did not have authority to accept the order.  Further, when a customer called 
requesting a price quote, a man-day rate under WCF, she also could not answer. 
3. Mounting Frustration 
Anonymous A felt frustrated with these changes:  “It feels like everything is 
always under construction [and like] it’s all happening all at once” (Anonymous A, 
2004).  She explained that during the transition, things felt reactionary instead of 
proactive and that the staff was “interpreting and creating unwritten rules” (Anonymous 
A, 2004).  She was learning new procedures as she went, resulting in wasted time and 
effort, particularly with the cumbersome processing of COARs.   
With completely different workflows and a significantly increased workload, 
Anonymous A’s daily frustration began to take its toll:  “You get no warm fuzzy when 
you come to work.  You’re ready for change, but not change every day” (Anonymous A, 
2004).  She explained further how the transition was affecting her morale, stating, “You 
give and give and give…and there’s no payback” (Anonymous A, 2004).  She then 
attributed her frustration to a root cause:  “There’s no instruction, no guideline…it’s like: 
‘Here’s mission funding, make it work’” (Anonymous A, 2004). 
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Anonymous B also expressed concern over the lack of instruction.  Having 
received training six months before the transition, she stated that it felt like a “crash 
course with no continuing training” and that she was being “told to succeed” 
(Anonymous B Interview, 2004).  Further, she felt that people were being “left to their 
own perception of change, left guessing” (Ibid).  Anonymous A expressed similar 
concerns, stating that she wanted more written documentation.  She felt she would have 
benefited from sitting with her counterparts at Pearl and watching them work.      
4. New Opportunities 
As the transition proceeded, the comptroller actively sought to take advantage of 
planned retirements and hire individuals who would create a team that could successfully 
implement MF (Comptroller B, 2004).  In November 2003, he hired an “intelligent 
perfectionist” (Ibid) who had 32 years of government accounting work to head the new 
Code 650 Analysis Branch (Code 600 Division Head Interview, 2004).  Created on 
October 1st of the same year, this division was modeled after Pearl Harbor’s Code 100F 
and reconciled data between STARS-FL and COST and would aid the comptroller in 
ensuring that the shipyard was on track in obligation and expenditure rates (Ibid).   
The comptroller also hired a new deputy comptroller in January 2004 for her 
extensive experience in mission funding.  With three years as an IMF accounting officer, 
two years as a comptroller at SUPSHIP, and six years as a comptroller at the Personnel 
Detachment Activity, Puget Sound (Deputy Comptroller Interview, 2004), this deputy 
comptroller not only brought experience, but also an innovative process initiative:  desk 
procedures.  Documenting every Code 600 employee’s workflows created these step-by-
step procedures.  Because PSNS had no such procedures from Pearl Harbor, they had to 
be created by the users.  While desk procedures aimed at streamlining the employee’s 
workflows, it also allowed for cross training and created an interoperable workforce 
(Ibid).  Further, it would provide documentation for future shipyard transformations.     
Along with these changes, in April of 2004, the comptroller’s job became much 
less burdened when the Budget and Execution Control Board (BECB) was formed.  This 
body, which reported to the shipyard commander, consisted of the nuclear engineering 
and planning manager, engineering planning manager, production resources officer, 
operations officer, nuclear production manager, the executive director, and the IMF CO, 
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with the comptroller as an advisor (PSNS&IMF NOTICE 7040, 2004).  Its purpose was 
to make decisions on the prioritization and use of financial resources for PSNS&IMF, a 
function that the comptroller had previously been performing after the shift to MF.  
While it did not supersede or relieve the comptroller of his duties, it provided command-
level control over the consolidation’s constrained resources.   
5. Effects on Management 
The frustration felt within Code 600 did not seem to reflect the rest of the 
shipyard’s involvement in the mission funding transition at the lower levels.  An 
anonymous manager (Anonymous C) who had been employed at PSNS for 34 years 
explained that middle managers were essentially shielding the shop worker from the 
effects of the transition to mission funding: 
Really, I think it’s at the higher levels for mission funding because we 
made a conscious choice, I believe, at the shipyard for the average worker:  
nothing was going to change for him.  He still comes to work; he still 
clocks in and clocks out, still has a job, and still gets a paycheck every 
Tuesday.  So mission funding shouldn’t have an impact on his level 
(Anonymous C Interview, 2004). 
 
On the other hand, this same middle manager reflected a need for specific 
clarification of what mission funding meant in his own job: 
We all have a different feeling on what [mission funding] meant.  In my 
mind mission funding is one job order.  You go to work you get the [work 
on the] ships done, but we still got a million job orders, you know?  We 
keep track of the infinite detail of what people do…So, it didn’t simplify 
our lives any, the way I see it (Ibid). 
Anonymous C then offered a recommendation:  
I think that there ought to be a mission funding handbook, or something 
like that, that gets down to the basics, that, you know, ‘What do you 
charge to when you’re working on a ship?’…I don’t know that there is a 
‘Mission Funding 101’ book, but I think there should be (Ibid).   
 
This manager’s supervisor (Anonymous D) offered a positive outlook, saying that 
despite the difficulties of the change that he “can see daylight here,” commenting on a 
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fairly upbeat environment.  However, he also reflected on the different effects of change 
on different levels of the organization: 
“I like [the changes], but I also get frustrated at the pace and speed.  I 
think at our level, it’s easy for managers to espouse change and advocate 
change.  I think where it’s really hard is defining what it means to your 
mid-level folks and the workers.  The biggest resistance level is always the 
mid-management [such as division managers and first-line supervisors] 
where they don’t see where you’re really going, they don’t know how it 
affects them, they always feel overwhelmed because you’ve laid so much 
on their plate.  I think you’ll find most upper managers in most businesses 
are not afraid of change, or they wouldn’t be where they are (Anonymous 
D Interview, 2004). 
Another employee (Anonymous E) offered a candid point of view about the 
change:  
I think the change is at a whirlwind pace.  There’s so much change 
between the change in the funding mechanism to the change with 
consolidations, the change to regional maintenance, the corporate changes 
going on to the “One Shipyard”, to draw down the size of the overhead 
and to take savings, transformation savings.  It’s all up to the point, it 
seems, that there’s too much change going on, which could lead to a lack 
of focus, and maybe not doing good on any one particular thing we’re 
asked to do…(Anonymous E Interview, 2004).   
 
The employee, dealing with the frustration, then offered a suggestion: 
I think that the initiatives are all good, and I certainly support them.  But 
what I just wish is that these things were done maybe perhaps a little bit in 
series to be able to move into the initiative [and to] recognize the lessons 
learned that come out of them, make the changes to support the lessons 
learned and then move on to the next change.  But…I fear, in a way, that 
with all the changes going on, something may fall out in terms of 
preparation or being successful…(Ibid). 
 
He then stated that having a “chronological road map on what to do, and when to 
do it, and when to do it by” would make the change easier, and that prioritizing changes 
would also help:  “To simply say it’s all important, to do it all now, makes it tough” 
(Ibid).  
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The shipyard commander offered his own recommendations for future shipyard 
change managers: 
Determine what your functional areas are, cross-reference them, bounce 
some gap analysis with whomever you’re consolidating with so you’re not 
doing it after the fact.  Because the functional areas are not going to 
change; they’re going to be [merged] together.  So that would be my 
recommendation…to look at the functional areas and how they line up, 
and then from that will drive what you’re requirements will be and then 
that will help you drive to the consolidated organization. 
 
The IMF CO had some further recommendations:  “I think a specific timetable 
would help.  I think in the big scheme of things, we’ve had a sort of rough timetable.”  He 
also provided a method of obtaining detailed plans, stating, “I think we’ve made the best 
progress when the two commanders have had direct face-to-face interaction with either 
the [functional area] teams or the Integration Management Team...when the commanders 
have had direct attention on what the issues are, what the progress is…” Command-level 
involvement, then, is another Key Success Factor.  Finally, he offered three levels of 
managing a mission-funded organization: 
Level 1: Manage scarcity by prioritizing work – the basic level 
Level 2: Seek out efficiencies within the organization to find savings 
Level 3: Identify alternative funding sources. 
 
 The IMF CO explained the principle behind level 3: 
See, that’s one thing we’ve figured out here [at IMF]:  we’ve got 
machinery that’s been given to us because it dries up a HAZMAT 
[hazardous material] stream or [reduces] pollution.  The Navy has pockets 
of money…so mission funding should drive creativity.  Instead of saying, 
‘Give me more money!’ you have to figure out, ‘Okay, who does have 
some money that they’re willing to give and is there some way I can tap 
into that?’ 
 
E.   CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has undergone a long change process.  Political, 
economic, social, and technological trends have resulted in mandates that directed the 
Puget Sound shipyard’s transformation.  These mandates created design changes aimed at 
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both the organization’s structure and financial management system.  Facing both strategic 
issues at the same time, PSNS management was tasked to formulate its own strategy and 
provide direction to the organization on how to implement the change.  While reaction to 
the change varied, employees whose workflows were affected felt a sense of frustration.  
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IV. CASE ANALYSIS 
This chapter examines the case of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and applies 
the change management and organizational principles summarized in Chapter II.  In 
doing so, it analyzes how well these shipyard managers are affecting change at the naval 
shipyards.  It also provides a basis for the findings and recommendations presented in 
Chapter V.  
The chapter begins by examining the way management has implemented change 
at PSNS, analyzing how well management has aligned its strategy with the six recurring 
change principles.  Then, using the broader analysis of the Organizational System’s 
Framework, the chapter assesses how well the PSNS system has adapted to its 
environmental changes, applying the principles of open system theory to the 
organization. 
 
A. APPLYING THE SIX RECURRING CHANGE PRINCIPLES 
Through its transition to mission funding and its merger of other activities, PSNS 
is undergoing a difficult transformation.  Its management created its own strategy to 
overcome transformational challenges, and in so doing provided lessons learned for 
future shipyard transformations.   
1. Formulating a Clear System Vision Statement  
The shipyard commander worked painstakingly to communicate his vision for the 
shipyard.  He used every opportunity to paint a picture of the organization’s future 
(transforming the shipyard into a provider for the nation’s needs, given a new 
environment) and to explain why the changes were necessary (Operation Iraqi Freedom, 
Fleet Response Plan, “One Shipyard” initiative).  He also attempted to link the changes to 
individuals’ work by using specific examples of individuals, projects, and process 
improvements within the shipyard.  The shipyard commander deliberately targeted his 
people as the audience for communicating his vision for the shipyard, supporting the 
basic principles behind creating a clear system vision. 
The next step, however, remains.  While his vision singled out areas requiring 
change, appeared to be reasonably concise, and did not reflect complicated plans or 
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programs (Kotter, 1996), Puget Sound Naval Shipyard had not yet rewritten its vision 
statement as of the time of the thesis interviews.  Although the command’s mission 
statement had been updated through strategic planning meetings, the vision statement had 
not.   
While the case showed that the shipyard commander had a precise and clear 
vision of the organization’s future state and took extensive measures to communicate it, 
these interviews suggested that employees could benefit from a written vision statement.  
As outlined in Chapter II, a clear vision statement would set clear targets, avoid technical 
words, and eliminate alternative interpretations of the vision.  Furthermore, it would use 
passion and conviction to translate words into images that would linger in people’s 
minds.   
Even with the shipyard commander’s extensive communications initiatives, 
alternative interpretations of the organization’s vision still existed.  When asked about the 
shipyard’s vision under mission funding, employees had differing interpretations.  Some 
of this confusion can be attributed to the word vision itself, which can be an evasive 
concept at any level of an organization.  Furthermore, these employees linked the 
organization’s vision directly to their everyday experience with mission funding, 
expressing a frustration partly rooted in a lack of detailed instructions.  (This need for 
detailed instructions is discussed further in Section 4 of this Chapter.)  Employees called 
for things like a mission funding handbook or detailed instructions on how to perform 
their tasks, items not necessarily attributable to a lack of alignment with change, which 
vision aims to overcome.     
It is instructive to note that the shipyard commander never mentioned the word 
vision in his interview, suggesting that he may have purposely avoided the abstraction of 
the word in his communication to his workforce.  But due to the many unknowns in their 
daily lives, employees associated their frustration with the organization’s vision.  
Providing a written statement of the vision, then, may help to alleviate this confusion. 
2. Obtaining Change Leadership Critical Mass  
As the case study reveals, the shipyard commander is a strong leader who focused 
his change efforts on his people.  Throughout his interview, he consistently tied 
conversations back to the people from the shipyard, speaking of implementing change by 
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openly communicating it.  He also talked of getting people excited about change by 
showing them the possible benefits they could obtain from it.  Furthermore, he spoke on a 
personal level regarding the honesty of his communications, his concerns over alleviating 
people’s fears, and the never-ending struggle to align people with the change.  With these 
as indicators, the PSNS case shows that the shipyard commander is a powerful driver for 
change within the organization, in keeping with the principles outlined in Chapter II. 
The shipyard commander also formed a core of leadership consisting of several 
groups.  His leadership council provides a close and informal forum by which important 
stakeholders can discuss and contribute to the shipyard’s direction.  In addition, through a 
broader group of stakeholders, the shipyard commander includes department and office 
heads in the development of plans, even including them in a collaborative process to 
develop key directional elements for the organization (as Jick, 2003, suggests).  For the 
change, he also created the Integration Management Team that includes stakeholders 
from both the former PSNS and the former IMF to lead process improvement.  The 12 
functional area teams also provide leadership groups that are attempting to determine the 
future state of the organization.  Finally, for the change to mission funding, he has left 
managerial and leadership specifics (as Kotter, 1996, recommends) to the comptroller, 
who aggressively took on the leadership role.   
With several leadership groups in place, the shipyard commander has surrounded 
himself with a strong leadership coalition.  Difficult decisions are being made at lower 
levels, and collaboration is a key element within these groups.  Thus, PSNS leadership 
has amassed a critical core, demonstrating adherence to this change principle. 
3. Communicating on Multiple Levels  
As discussed previously, the shipyard commander embodied the principle of open 
and pervasive communications.  As the cornerstone of his change management strategy, 
his communication was deliberate and methodical with the intent of being inspirational, 
speaking on the transforming the shipyard to meet the needs of the nation and tying this 
concept to employee’s jobs.  His communication strategy also met the tenets outlined in 
Chapter II.   
First, the shipyard commander attempted to create a sense of trust by addressing 
what he expressed was his core challenge in the change:  employee fear.  He also 
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espoused transparent management with his communication plan, providing a strategy that 
would inform the workforce of any shortfalls.  Further, he expressed concern over the 
alignment between communicated words and actions and talked of exciting people over 
the change, an element that Kotter (1996) espouses.  Finally, the shipyard commander 
used every available channel to market the change, communicating on a daily basis 
through personal addresses and visits, meetings, newsletters, and videos.   
The IMF CO reflected a similar strategy.  While his communication strategy was 
not a focus of the thesis, his strategy did address employee fear, attempting to channel the 
energy into constructive inputs for the change.  He also communicated on a daily basis 
and used multiple channels such as frequent meetings with his leadership stakeholders, 
newsletters, and Captain’s Call.  Thus, the pervasiveness of communications from both 
the shipyard and IMF commanders displayed the importance of this principle in 
implementing the changes at a consolidated activity such as PSNS&IMF.  Finally, the 
shipyard commander used every available channel to market the change, communicating 
on a daily basis through personal addresses, frequent visits, meetings, newsletters, and 
videos.   
Shipyard managers, therefore, should embrace the shift to mission funding and 
serve as champions of the transformation.  Leadership by example becomes critical 
during organizational change when actions visibly communicate management position 
and when inertia can present a threat to change.  Further, shipyard management should 
disseminate the vision down to the ranks of the organization through daily and pervasive 
communications.   
4. Addressing Change Inertia  
The shipyard commander and the IMF CO both viewed organizational inertia 
through the eyes of their people, qualifying it as fear.  This assessment indicates that 
these leaders recognized the organizational blocks to change.  Arguably, by addressing 
their people’s fears, these leaders were able to gain acceptance and support from both 
employees and managers.  In fact, one employee stated that she was ready for change 
(although not for change every day).  Given this statement, is acceptance and support 
enough to overcome people’s challenges in the transition? 
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a.   Implicit Employee Contracts 
Chapter II describes Strebel’s (1998) concept of three implicit contracts 
between an organization and its employees and relates this idea to the two major 
equilibria involved with an organization.  Psychological contracts (unwritten mutual 
agreements) and social contracts (those that compare the actual versus the espoused 
beliefs and values) could not be analyzed for this case, since data for this comparison 
were not yet available.  The case study shows, however, that formal contracts 
(agreements on established task and performance requirements) had not been renewed 
after the change.   
The quoted Code 600 employees, the career middle manager, and the 
anonymous employee were left to work out the details of their tasks on their own, just 
like the shipyard commander.  For these employees, formal contracts established under 
the WCF had become null and void.  Tasks and performance requirements were being 
recreated as work went on, to the point of employee frustration.  Without any guidance 
on how to conduct their work under mission funding, these personnel sought specific 
direction and “chronological road maps” (as the anonymous employee stated) on how to 
conduct their every day work processes.  While the organization underwent transition, 
these formal contracts needed to be renewed. 
These employees also expressed a loss of control in their workplace with 
the transition to MF.  This was reflected in comments such as “change every day,” “it’s 
all happening all at once” and “it didn’t simplify our lives any.”  With the shift to mission 
funding, organizational norms and comfort zones associated with the WCF structure were 
eliminated.  If given specific direction on how to conduct their work, these personnel 
would likely obtain an increased sense of job control. 
The PSNS case shows that employee alignment with change is not enough 
to overcome barriers and inertia to change.  When it comes down to it, where the change 
has the most effect is in how it affects everyday lives and personal contracts.  At the same 
time, however, a change leader cannot be reasonably required to determine how a change 
will affect every single detail of every single employee in the organization.  Nonetheless, 
shipyard management may have a tool to aid not only current transitions, but also future 
ones.   
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Desk procedures are being implemented within Code 600 at PSNS, 
although no evidence was gathered that such procedures were being used in other offices.  
Others in the organization whose work processes have been affected by the change to MF 
may benefit from their use.  This includes, in particular, middle managers.  These desk 
procedures could not only bring structure to the new work processes, but could provide 
future use by other shipyards that will be transitioning to MF.  Although desk procedures 
would not eliminate the initial need for instruction, subsequent employees would have the 
benefit of specific instructions.  Further, even without initial instructions, consciously 
undergoing a change process with the understanding and acknowledgement that no 
procedure exists may help to channel employees’ efforts into creating the very 
instructions that they lack. 
b.   Sense of Urgency 
By communicating the future vision of the shipyard and the importance of 
employees’ tasks to the workforce, the shipyard commander attempted to create a sense 
of urgency for the changes at PSNS, as recommended by Kotter (1996).   These sessions, 
however, could better create a sense of urgency in a way that Nadler and Tushman (1989) 
recommend:  alerting people to the pain that may result without change.   
Due mainly to command-level involvement in the massive consolidation, 
creating a sense of urgency for implementing MF was delegated to the comptroller.  His 
aggressive training program to educate the workforce on the transition to MF sanctioned 
this sense of urgency.   As the comptroller conducted training on the legal restrictions and 
repercussions of appropriated funding, part of his aim was to instill a sense of 
responsibility over the new form of funding.  By warning management of these legal 
sanctions, the comptroller was working to instill a sense of urgency for change over the 
fear of financial pain. 
Although the comptroller took the lead in creating this sense of urgency, it 
should be noted that the responsibility for communicating the legal aspects of mission 
funding should not fall entirely on the comptroller.  As discussed in the case study, the 
creation of the Budget Execution and Control Board reflected this realization.  With 
budgetary control and maintenance prioritization receiving command-level attention, the 
responsibility for fiscal discipline was raised to a higher level in the organization, 
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escalating its importance and visibility.  Thus, instilling a sense of urgency and potential 
pain over the legal constraints of MF should be a task receiving full attention by the 
senior levels of the shipyard command, just as PSNS has shown. 
c.   Long-term Inertia 
Shipyard and IMF leadership were explicitly aware of the need to 
implement a long-term strategy for change.  In fact, both commanding officers expressed 
the need for command involvement in what they considered an unending change process.  
Although these commanders did not view it as a constant struggle against organizational 
inertia (as Chapter II suggested), each viewed the situation as a long-term change.  Both 
commanders understood that for them to achieve success, they would have to “never be 
satisfied” and “continue to adjust.” 
This long-term, command-level involvement in the change process is vital 
for the transition to mission funding.  These leaders looked beyond their tenure as 
commanding officers to keep the change in perspective:  the transformation of their 
organizations would still be occurring after they changed commands.  Sharing this similar 
view additionally showed unity of command and alignment toward a commitment to 
long-term success.  At the same time, this long-term view of change may have benefited 
from short-term successes. 
5. Creating a Learning Organization through Short-Term Results 
The Puget Sound case study also shows that senior Navy leaders have adopted an 
important aspect of change management:  results-oriented change.  Through the trial-and-
error experience over metrics at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, PSNS is developing a 
robust system for measuring results, expanding the baseline for measures to 12 metrics.  
While measuring these outputs may seem cumbersome to managers, they drive at the 
heart of creating a learning organization.  However, as the literature review reveals, 
measuring results is only part of this change management principle. 
Interviewees (managers and employees) communicated a feeling of frustration 
over how much change PSNS was undertaking.  As the case explains, PSNS went 
through a rapid succession of major changes:  from the consolidation with IMF and five 
other minor activities in May 2003; to the transition to mission funding in October; to the 
merging of SUPSHIP, FTSCPAC, and portions of CNSGPNW the following May.  This 
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was part of the cause for frustration revealed by phrases such as “change every day,” 
“everything is always under construction,” and “frustrated at the pace and speed.”  The 
anonymous employee summarized these observations by stating, “change is at a 
whirlwind pace.”  
The employees’ observations reinforce the findings presented in Chapter II:  The 
key to these results-based changes is implementing incremental results.  As the 
anonymous employee suggests, taking the changes “perhaps a little bit in series” would 
help.  This statement also suggests that management could benefit from working toward 
short-term results, an example of which would be the early assessment of functional areas 
and the implementation of best practices, as the shipyard commander and IMF CO 
suggested.  Another example that could benefit the comptroller staff is the creation of 
specific milestones for the alignment between COST and STARS-FL.  If these managers 
and employees could observe such incremental results, they would be given the 
opportunity to celebrate short-term successes. 
The literature review also explains that “initial bursts of change activity followed 
by relatively sedate progress” (Amis, Slack, and Hinings, 2004) mark a successful change 
program, and that prioritizing improvements would help achieve this pattern.  The 
anonymous employee reinforces this concept by stating, “to simply say it’s all important, 
to do it all now, makes it tough.”  To aid such employees in implementing change at the 
shipyards, then, managers could direct their initial efforts into quickly but effectively 
changing major processes.  For example, patches between the information processing 
systems COST and STARS-FL could be completed very early in the transition, just as 
PSNS Code 600 personnel attempted to do following the consolidation. 
Given the information that he had about the Pearl Harbor transformation, the 
shipyard commander attempted to implement the best practice by slowing down the pace 
of change at PSNS.  Despite his efforts to implement deliberate and gradual change, 
however, employees still felt that change was happening too fast.  Arguably, the shipyard 
commander’s efforts to slow down the change helped to avoid the chaos associated with 
attempting to implement change immediately and concurrently as was done at Pearl 
Harbor.  For example, the creation of the IMT and functional area teams showed a 
commitment to assessing the impact of management’s actions during the change, to 
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eliminating processes that did not contribute to overall goals of the change, and to 
creating a learning process for the change, three concepts suggested by Schaffer and 
Thomson (1998).  These teams were intended to work toward best practices for the entire 
organization as it transformed.  Nonetheless, based on the needs of the Navy, these 
changes were, by nature, immediate and concurrent. 
While external mandates continue to direct immediate design changes within the 
shipyards, management cannot control the overall pace and speed of change in their 
organizations.  Based on the command and control structure of the Navy and the urgent 
need for flexible maintenance capabilities, slowing down the overall pace of change and 
taking changes in series is not practically feasible for the Navy.  However, management 
can employ methods to relieve organizational frustration with this overall pace. 
Prioritization could benefit employees.  By patching the two incompatible 
accounting systems early on and using desk procedures to document this, personnel in the 
Code 600 office could benefit from early change.  Further, middle managers working 
with the two different financial systems could establish their workflow norms early, 
allowing for work to proceed and for subsequent, minor changes to take place.   
Creating short-term successes could also help.  Because employees did not see 
immediate results of their efforts, they felt as if they were in perpetual change.  While 
long-term goals are in place, short-term targets would help.  Together, prioritization and 
the creation of short-term successes could help to lessen the effects of unknown task and 
performance requirements. 
6. Rewarding Change Behavior 
As discussed in Chapter II, management can affect (but cannot create) culture.  
Further, as Kotter (1996) explains, changes to culture emerge only when new behaviors 
produce continual benefits to the organization’s people.  The PSNS shipyard commander 
acknowledged this as a part of his change strategy, advising that change managers must 
“take behaviors that support the change and reinforce them” (Orzalli, 2004).  This 
statement displays an understanding that change at the shipyards cannot simply be 
directed to occur.  While the shipyard commander took orders from higher up his chain- 
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of-command, he understood that implementing change within his organization did not 
mean simply relaying that order.  He understood that he had to reward and reinforce his 
people’s new behaviors. 
On the other hand, some would argue that the centralized nature of the shipyard 
command structure eliminates the need for such a leadership mass.  When upper 
management sends a directive down the chain-of-command, Navy leaders are trained to 
take the order and disseminate it as if it were their own, barring any professional dissent.  
In a sense, then, such a core of leadership automatically forms under the command-and-
control structure and should not require additional effort.   
Such a concept of leadership at the shipyards, however, has one critical fault:  the 
organizations’ overwhelmingly civilian workforce.  Given the lack of a truly command-
and-control structure and the underlying principles of the change inertia, efforts to force 
change upon the shipyard could serve only to defeat its own purpose.  Furthermore, the 
public sector civilian workforce is better equipped against furloughs than employees in 
the private sector; inertia thus cannot be underestimated.  Therefore, a single directive 
alone cannot take the place of leadership in a change program at the naval shipyards. 
Despite the shipyard commander’s acknowledgement of the need to reward 
people for change, however, evidence suggested that the shipyard’s reward system could 
benefit significantly by receiving command-level attention.  Although the shipyard 
commander displayed a commitment to change through his persistent message and his 
establishment of integration teams, and although he attempted to draw change behavior 
into everyday employee lives through a rigorous communication plan (both attributes that 
Kotter, 1996, espouse), the task of rewarding change activities was delegated to the PAO.  
This observation is not made to understate the PAO’s effectiveness in implementing such 
a program; rather, it suggests the benefits of displaying command-level commitment to 
rewarding change behavior. 
Albrecht, et. al (eds., “Implementing”, 2002) further recommended four aspects of 
creating a learning organization.  Based on the available data, three of their 
recommendations (integrate learning processes into training programs, attempt to prevent 
learning from becoming a chore, monitor progress and take action quickly) could not be 
analyzed.  The final aspect (be open to employees about failure) was discussed in Section 
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3.  Aside from this discussion, transparency of shipyard management, which the PSNS 
shipyard commander espoused, would allow the workforce to not only celebrate 
successes but also understand organizational failures.  Doing so would maintain the 
people’s alignment to change and would also allow the workforce to understand the 
potential impacts of their actions.   
Understanding, therefore, that cultural change emerges from incremental change, 
shipyard managers can look to institutionalize the process of change by affecting their 
cultures.  From managers to employees, transformation must be incorporated into every 
part of the workplace in order to ensure the longevity of change efforts.   
7. Summary  
Table 2 summarizes the results of the change management analysis on the Puget 
Sound Naval Shipyard case.  PSNS management has closely implemented two of the six 
change management principles, Amass a Leadership Core and Communicate on Multiple 
Levels.  Improvements in the remaining four principles may help management implement 
a lasting change process. 
Create a Clear 
Vision 
Statement 
Management’s vision is clear, but employees’ interpretation could be 
clarified.  While the shipyard commander has worked laboriously to 
communicate his vision, the next step lies in creating a vision 
statement to clarify the organization’s future state. 
Amass a  
Leadership 
Core 
Shipyard commander’s core consists of leadership council, 
department and office heads, IMT, functional area teams, and 




Shipyard commander makes communications a priority, using 
multiple channels in the attempt to ease fears, communicate openly, 
and to excite the workforce.  IMF CO reflects a similar approach. 
Address Change 
Inertia 
Shipyard commander and IMF CO have gained general acceptance, 
but employees require specific task and performance requirements.  





Managers can prioritize and attempt to implement short-term results.  
This will help provide direction, moral support, and a sense of 
progress and accomplishment to employees and middle management 
and to provide some control over the pace of change.  
Reward Change 
Behavior 
PSNS&IMF management is working to reinforce new behaviors and 
is developing a reward program for change.  However, command-
level involvement may show a greater commitment to rewarding 
change. 
Table 2. Assessment of PSNS Change Management. 
70 
B. APPLYING THE ORGANIZATIONAL SYSTEM’S FRAMEWORK 
Chapter II described the Organizational System’s Framework as an open systems 
model that contains several interrelationships.  The case study shows one such 
interrelationship between the design changes in structure and financial management.  It 
also demonstrated the ripple effect of change as each change affected the other.  Finally, 
the case reveals the key success factors required to undergo the transformational change. 
1. Multiple Change Efforts 
Change at PSNS occurred, like for most public organizations, based on external 
mandates.  These mandates directed change in two specific design factors:  structure and 
financial management.  While creating change in just one design area poses challenges on 
its own, undergoing two such changes simultaneously proved to complicate 
management’s transformation efforts.  Because of the breadth and depth of the structural 
change, the implementation of financial management change was affected. 
PSNS and IMF were two distinctly different organizations.  Their people were 
different, with civilian maintenance employees forming the majority of the workforce at 
PSNS while a mix of military and civilian employees worked at IMF.  Tasks were 
different as well, with multiple production lines at PSNS versus the one submarine 
production line at IMF.  Finally, workflows were different as PSNS worked under the 
AIM planning system and IMF worked under LDS.  The consolidation of the two major 
organizations, then, posed significant challenges to management.   
PSNS management attempted to focus on both changes at the same time mainly 
due to the framework of the shipyard’s mandates:  to transform the shipyard into a 
flexible, ready maintenance provider.  With these mandates, the transition to mission 
funding became categorized as simply a part of the consolidation.  The mandates thus 
directed two simultaneous changes.  In fact, the mandate’s justification qualified the 
change in financial management as a secondary effect, asserting that the shift to mission 
funding would simply benefit the consolidation effort.  Because this mandate understated 
the importance of the change to mission funding, management was given a framework for 
implementation that would do the same. 
The shift to mission funding should not be underestimated.  The shipyards would 
benefit from command-level attention to the impact of transitioning from a revolving 
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fund to appropriated funding.  The creation of the BECB reveals a vital learning 
experience for PSNS as it signaled a change in management mindset over the shift.  This 
mindset for fiscal responsibility under constrained resources, a shift created within PSNS, 
must be carried on to future shipyard transformations. 
2. Ripple Effects on the Organization 
Corrective interventions within an organization theoretically create ripple effects 
throughout.  PSNS was no exception.  While the majority of disrupted workflows existed 
within the financial management design factor, the change also affected middle managers 
such as the anonymous manager.  His department head also shed light on how middle 
management became affected.  Just like the employees of Code 600, the anonymous 
manager was seeking the definition of mission funding as it applied specifically to his 
job.  The change in financial management not only affected the comptroller’s office, but 
affected other workflows.  
It even affected the shipyard commander.  With a large number of WCF carryover 
projects and having to work with “multiple sets of rules all at the same time” (Orzalli, 
2004), his job of assessing and ensuring the success of the transition had become 
noticeably hindered.  Although these difficulties should presumably subside as WCF 
projects become completed and a learning curve is built, they show that the shift to 
mission funding affected various workflows in the organization and demonstrate the 
ripple effect of the change. 
Senior shipyard managers undergoing this transformational change must 
understand that changing their financial management system will not simply affect the 
comptroller’s office.  In fact, over reliance on delegated authority to the comptroller 
would understate the importance of the shift.  Management would benefit from 
recognizing the effects of the transition to mission funding and from framing their 
changes as organization-wide. 
3. Key Success Factors 
PSNS management faced more than one strategic issue in their transformational 
change.  As it attempted to align financial systems, management was attempting to  
 
72 
undertake the challenges of consolidation.  In so doing, however, PSNS management and 
employees revealed some of its key success factors – factors applicable to future shipyard 
transformations. 
a.   Command-level Attention to Mission Funding Issues 
Multiple consolidations at PSNS arguably distracted management from the 
important issue of financial change.  The responsibility over the prioritization of 
maintenance work initially fell upon the shipyard comptroller, causing him to make 
important decisions based on limited information.  The creation of the BECB, however, 
brought the strategic issue of financial success under MF on the same level of attention as 
the consolidation of maintenance facilities and processes.  This provides a key success 
factor for the shipyards’ change to MF:  command-level attention to mission funding 
issues.  Future shipyard transformation managers, therefore, should not underestimate the 
dramatic change from a WCF-driven culture to one under MF.   
b.   Commitment to Best Practices 
The differences in design factors, while creating difficulty, also provided a 
means for a mutually beneficial relationship.  Having had the experience of operating 
under mission funding, IMF personnel had important lessons to teach.  The shipyard 
commander and IMF CO made a commitment to implement best practices between the 
two organizations, showing collaboration at the command level to building such a 
relationship.  The consolidated activity also included members from both PSNS and IMF 
in the functional area teams, an important element for implementing the transformation.  
Finally, the hiring of a Deputy Comptroller with vast experience under MF significantly 
enhanced the ability of PSNS Code 600 to take on the challenges of the new structure.  
Another key success factor for PSNS&IMF and for future mission-funded shipyards, 
then, lies in involving personnel with MF expertise in producing best practices under MF. 
c.   Specific Timetable of Milestones 
The IMF CO was one such example of MF expertise.  His organization’s 
experience in MF would serve as a vital source for learning.  One key success factor 
offered by the CO was the creation of a specific timetable of milestones, which further 
supports the conclusions of creating short-term results.  The critical requirement for 
creating such a timetable, as suggested by the IMF CO, would be command-level 
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involvement.  In his interview he stated that he saw the best results when both the 
shipyard commander and he interacted closely with the Integration Management Team 
and the 12 functional area teams.  Such command-level involvement would hold teams 
accountable to creating incremental successes for all mission-funded shipyards. 
d. Alternative Funding Sources 
The IMF CO also offered that managing a mission-funded activity 
involved adopting a different mindset.  He explained three levels of MF management, 
with the third level being identifying alternative funding sources.  The IMF CO explained 
that rather than living with the limited funds provided through appropriations, the IMF 
sought out such alternatives as free equipment from environmental protection 
organizations.  Level 3, then, provides a final key success factor that PSNS may or may 
not be currently implementing, but one that the mission-funded consolidated activity 
could adopt.   
e.   Functional Area Assessments 
The shipyard commander offered a critical milestone and key success 
factor that his organization had discovered through the change process:  functional area 
assessments.  Defining functional areas and organizational roles and responsibilities early 
on in the transformation allowed PSNS management to overcome a major step in their 
transition to MF as a consolidated activity.  At the same time, it would eliminate 
overlapping functions and seek to employ best practices.  Doing so also supports the 
principle of creating short-term results, allowing management to move on to less difficult 
changes.  Functional area assessments, therefore, may help shipyard management in 
determining and defining organizational boundaries as it faces the many unknowns of 
transformation. 
f.   Desk Procedures 
Finally, the employees of PSNS Code 600, anonymous managers, and the 
anonymous PSNS&IMF employee together revealed a major key success factor for 
easing transition to MF:  desk procedures.  PSNS employees and management were 
navigating uncharted waters through the transition to MF.  Desk procedures may now be 
helping Code 600 define workflows.  Because no written guidance will be given to future 
transitioning shipyards, documentation of specific lessons learned in workflow 
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management will be essential for working under new conditions and for successfully 
changing financial management structures at the shipyards from Working Capital Funds 
to mission funding.   
4. Summary 
The OSF shows the interrelationships within the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, 
framing the organization’s changes within two major design factors.  While it reveals the 
effects of one change over the other, it also shows the ripple effects of the changes as 
multiple levels of the organization are affected.  Finally, it produces key success factors 





With multiple changes occurring at the same time, the change to 
mission funding may receive less attention than needed.  Senior 
leadership at the consolidated, mission-funded activities should 
engage in this difficult shift in mindsets. 
Commitment to 
Best Practices 
Lessons can be learned from individuals with MF expertise.  
Shipyard management is benefiting from some of the differences in 
design factors between PSNS and IMF and the hiring of new 




This could help create short-term goals for the organization’s 
people.  PSNS&IMF is showing that such a timetable can best be 
created with command-level involvement. 
Alternative 
Funding Sources 
Rather than working with the limited funding available through 
mission funding, seek out alternative sources to help supplement 
the consolidated activity’s budget. 
Functional Area 
Assessments 
Define roles and responsibilities early on in the transition to employ 
best practices, eliminate overlapping functions, and provide the 
foundation for future change. 
Desk Procedures 
Specific workflow documentation will be a key to providing 
guidance into unknown territory.  Applications may be made at 
various levels of the shipyard organization. 
Table 3.  PSNS Key Success Factors. 
 
 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has implemented a change program that, through 
managerial analysis, has produced possible areas of improvement and key factors for 
success at future shipyards.  While improvements can always be made in this long and 
difficult transformation process, this essay outlines methods by which the naval shipyards 
can better implement mission funding.  These principles can be applied to future shipyard 
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transformations with the aim of aiding managers in implementing a lasting change 
program under a mission-funded structure, allowing the Navy to meet the growing 












































V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents the findings resulting from the analysis in Chapter IV.  It 
will present the results of the thesis by answering the research questions posed in Chapter 
I.  It will then explain the limitations of this study.  Lastly, it offers recommendations for 
further consideration under the topic of implementing the mission-funded naval shipyard. 
 
A. FINDINGS 
Chapter I presented a primary thesis research objective of determining how naval 
shipyard management could better implement mission funding after having operated 
extensively under a Working Capital Fund structure.  To achieve this objective, it posed 
the following supporting research questions: 
 
• What are the differences between WCF and MF?  What managerial implications 
do each hold for shipyard managers? 
• What organizational theories can be applied to change at the naval shipyards? 
• What are the basic principles of transformational change?  How can these 
principles be applied to the naval shipyards’ transformation? 
 
Working Capital Funds and mission funding are two bipolar funding structures.  
While the WCF promotes business-like relationships aiming at full cost visibility, MF 
promotes the management of scarce funds.  Where incentives exist under WCF to attract 
additional work to lower per-unit overhead allocation, incentives under MF are to 
improve efficiency and effectively prioritize work.  Under WCF, seeking out extra jobs 
fills periods of low workforce utilization; under MF, these periods are used for training, 
proficiency work, or leave.  Further, a WCF shipyard charges costs when material is 
used; at a mission-funded shipyard, once material is ordered, money has been obligated.  
Finally, where success under WCF meant breaking even, under MF it meant completing 
organizational processes under constrained resources.  These differences create the 
underlying challenges of change at the naval shipyards.   
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This thesis has shown that several principles exist in current management 
literature that can be applied to this change at the naval shipyards.  Applying six recurring 
principles of successful change management, the author offers the following 
recommendations to shipyard managers: 
 
• Early in the planning phase of the transition and consolidation: 
o Create and post a clear vision statement to align employees with change 
o Amass a leadership core to delegate duties and encourage collaboration to 
drive change 
• Throughout the execution of transformation: 
o Communicate on multiple levels and as close to a daily basis as feasible 
o Address change inertia by tending to employees’ specific tasks 
o Alleviate the given pace with prioritization and short-term successes, 
completing the most important changes first 
o Reward change behavior 
 
Further, through analysis using an organizational open-systems framework, the 
author recommends the following key factors for success in implementing mission 
funding at the naval shipyards: 
 
• Provide command-level attention to: 
o Establishing and executing a change reward system 
o Addressing mission funding issues 
o Creating specific timetables for execution 
• Make a commitment to best practices and: 
o Surround yourself with mission funding expertise 
o Seek alternative funding sources to supplement the budget such as 
environmental protection grants and donations 
• Perform functional area assessments early in and throughout the change process 
• Develop and employ desk procedures where practicable 
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Managing the change to mission funding at the shipyards has been and will 
remain a difficult task.  Undergoing a series of difficult changes all within a short time, 
managers and employees alike will work to redefine the organization.  These findings 
seek to ease the transition to mission funding for the Navy’s transforming shipyards.   
 
B. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
In conducting the research for this thesis, interview data were limited in scope due 
to constraints on time.  Key managers who were deeply involved in the change process 
and employees at the center of the change were selected for interviews.  Analysis and 
findings were thus formed with a limited sample size of data.  While these interviews 
aimed at the center of the change process, further interviews with a larger random sample 
size may produce broader results.   
 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Implementing mission funding at the naval shipyards is a topic rich in issues for 
managing a change revolving around a fundamental change in financial management.  
Many of the principles researched for this thesis can be applied in the following topics: 
1. Comparison of Change Implementation  
Having completely different design factors than Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, 
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard offers a unique look at the implementation of mission 
funding.  Further study comparing and contrasting the implementation methods and 
programs between PHNSY and PSNS may benefit both shipyards.  Further, a comparison 
between these two programs may produce lessons learned for Norfolk and Portsmouth 
Naval Shipyards 
2. A Study on the Improvements in the PSNS Pilot 
A second look at the PSNS pilot program and the implementation of change at the 
shipyard may be performed in two years’ time.  Such a study could apply the principles 
found through this research and take a look at how far PSNS management has come in 
the transformation, what issues they are facing, what the organization’s future looks like, 
and how the shipyard fits into its environment.  This study could aim at providing further 
recommendations for the PSNS change program. 
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3. Application of Thesis Principles to Other Shipyards  
The principles of organizational theory and change management presented in this 
thesis may be expounded upon using additional research.  Further, with Norfolk Naval 
Shipyard (NNSY) and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard (PNSY) scheduled to transition to MF 
(pending PSNS results), these accumulated principles can be applied to NNSY and/or 
PNSY to aid managers in establishing their change programs. 
4. A Study on the Change Implications of Consolidations 
While this study revolve around a look at the implications of a change in financial 
management systems, further studies can examine the issues revolving around 
consolidating two vastly different organizations.  Several resources are available 
regarding the mergers of private and of public sector organizations.  As a major part of 
the shipyards’ transformation, this research may be helpful in implementing the two 
design factor changes. 
5. A Study on Applications to Other Public Sector Organizations 
Principles of change management apply not only to the naval shipyards, but to all 
public and private sector organizations.  The Department of the Navy, Department of 
Defense, and all government agencies are transforming to meet the needs of the nation’s 
emerging needs.  As these organizations undergo differing levels of transformational 
change, the principles researched in this thesis may be applied to aid management in 
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